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acknowledged. 
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Institute of Race Relations, or of any Government. 
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California Institute of Technology. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
BECHUANALAND, one of the United Kingdom" three High 
Commission Territories in southern Africa, is not only being 
born as a nation-it is also becoming a battleground between 
the ideology and the armed forces of Pan-Africanism on the 
north, and the racial thinking and military establishment of 
the Republic of South Africa on the south. Through early 
1964, the primary political focus was upon refugees fleeing 
the Republic; in most instances, simply passing through the 
Protectorate on their way to Dar es Salaam and points 
north. But one rather different event to be discussed in 
detail in this book is the kidnapping of Kenneth Abrahams, 
a Coloured doctor, inside Bechuanaland, and his stab- 
sequent release by the South African Government. 
The B.P. (as it is known locally) has r,qoo miles of com- 
mon frontier with South West Africa. Depending upon 
World Court decisions and actions in the United Nations, 
this border is a potentially explosive factor in world politics. 
Another source of possible political dispute, and of military 
action, is the proximity of Bechuanaland to southern Angola, 
separated from it only by the eastern half of the thirty- 
mile-wide Caprivi Zipfel. 
The political future of the three High Commission Terri- 
tories is a question mark. Only recently did Great Britain 
cease to have her High Commissioner in Pretoria doubling 
as the Ambassador to South Africa, and responsible for 
Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland. In addition, 
Prime Minister Vemoerd9s proposal fbr a referendum 
in the three territories about association with South &iea 
hangs in politically-charged air. 
We will discuss the Protectorates and South Africa later, 
because they are far more integral a part of South African 
Bantu policy than generally realised. A senior South 
Mrican oEcia% put it candidly to the writer: W e  must show 
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that we can work with the emer.ging AdEican states. If we 
were to take over Bechuanaland physically, it would make 
a farce of our whole Bantustan policy.' 
Judging from the international and continental pressures 
involved, the B.P. could simply become a pawn on the 
African chessboard or, in another common metaphor, 
ground between the stones of black and white nationalism. 
But the gestation of a Bechuanaland nation raises the 
possibility of the people of that country evolving a policy of 
their own, and of playing a significant role in the affairs of 
the major African powers. 
The words of Seretse Khama to the writer in Lobatsi, 
B.P., forecast such a development: 'Our role is not one of 
violence. We will achieve our independence without it. Our 
mission for Africa will be to demonstrate for our neighbour 
South Africa tllat we have a stable African government in 
which no man is discriminated against on racial grounds 
and in which the living standards of all are being raised.' 
Before expanding 011 some of the issues just raised, this 
study sketches the demographic and physical background 
of Bechuanaland, and traces the significant historical 
threads leading to contemporary nation-building. I t  then 
analyses the attitudes of the diverse inhabitants towards 
their country and outlines the present and potential eco- 
nomic development. Relations between Bechuanaland and 
other countries then become meaningful, and lead to some 
conclusions. 
I. PEOPLE AND COUNTRYSIDE 
WHAT are the Bechuanas like? Individuals, of course, run 
the gamut of human experiences, with exceptio~~s to every 
generalisation. But peoples do have particular character- 
istics. Yet it is often difficult and misleading to analyse the 
character of a people while under colonial rule. I t  seems to 
stifle some aspects of artistic development and qualities 
of generosity on one hand, while it certainly puts a damper 
on excesses which may stem from what westerners would 
describe as character defects. The variegated individuality 
of a people is more difficult to observe in an essentially 
colonial situation-even in a situation such as Bechuana- 
land, with a history of good race relations and a sympathetic 
administration. 
Henry Lichtenstein travelled through the southernmost 
part of Bechuana country in 1805 and quotes the views of 
men he encountered in his journeys. One of these, Van der 
Lingen, a missionary, refers to the 'perverseness' of the 
Bechuanas 'who would not receive Christian instruction'. 
Yet on closer questioning, he conceded his mission pre- 
decessors had been driven away because of a 'querulousness 
and thirst of rule'. Another missionary, John Kok, said the 
Bechuanas were 'prone to anger, artful, suspicious, and 
warlike . . .' But if one examines the historical record of 
European action in their territory, there is much reason for 
harbouring suspicions and being prone to anger. If Euro- 
peans have so long made sweeping generalised statements 
about African tribes, it is too much to expect that in those 
days Africans would distinguish what might be a 'good' 
European from the general run. 
A generation later, David Livingstone came to know the 
Bechuana more intimately. Scattered through his letters 
(brilliantly edited by Professor I. Schapera) are such 
comments as (1841) : 'The Bechuanas are great beggars. 
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Indeed they seem to make it a matter of conscience to 
neglect no opportunity of asking, and a refusal does not by 
any means put them out if it is done in a jocular way.' But 
the famous missionary recognised that 'It is only occasionally 
they think it is worth while to tell you what their opinion 
of you is, and really it is ludicrous enough to hear their 
epithets. Instead of getting vexed by them, they always 
powerfully excite my risible faculties.' 
The ncxt year, Livingstone thought: 'There is no goodness 
among them uniess it is implanted by the gospel. I should 
not be the least surprised to hear of treachery from any of 
them, they have no fear of God before their eyes.' 
Reading early nlissionary accounts of African peoples is 
often like listening to a prosecutor in court, who is utterly 
convinced oi'his case. Because we almost always lack the 
defendant's answers-although some long ignored or 
suppressed ones can be found-the resulting judgment we 
often form about earlier African societies is at  the worst 
distorted, and at the best sympathetic hut lacking in facts. 
Granted that the personality of the Bechuanas will be 
much easier to perceive when they have greater control over 
their own affairs, they do appear to be a fairly average 
African cattle people. That is to say, they do not stand out 
for warlike or aggressive qualities, nor as being particularly 
meek; they are neither exceptionally hardworking nor lazy. 
The few who have had educational advantages can hold 
their own with members of any tribe or nation. But the 
great mass are so limited in formal education, and so much 
of what they know best is in the esoteric realm of cattle 
raising, that to one who would judge by broad African 
standards, they appear a relatively unexuberant and simple 
pastoral people. In a Bechuana beerhall, there is little of 
the colour, excitement, and sense of virility one feels in 
Nigeria, nor is there among their women the degree of 
cleverness and drive one finds amongst market women in 
Accra. And, of course, they lack the sophistication of the 
urbanised and westernised rnan who lives it1 a Johannesburg 
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suburb, even if the man still has tribal rights in the Ciskei. 
Perhaps because they have far less education, the Bechuanas 
do not have the quickness or adaptability one delights in 
with many Nyasas, nor have they the reputation for being 
able to perdbrm difficult industrial tasks enjoyed by their 
fellow migrants, the Basuto. On the other hand, one has a 
feeling of greater openness and ability to develop along 
modern economic lines than one senses in a Masai manyatta 
(encampment). Many of the Bechuana disadvantages, 
such as nomadism and its effect on education, are ones they 
share with other cattle people. 
With the exception of an Llite numbering under I ,000, one 
can compare the Bechuana people with a potentially fertile 
but dry field growing mediocre crops. What will happen 
when water, in the form of broader education, irrigates 
the fieId, is impossibIe to assess. One can say that the present 
generation is likeable, desirous of learning, and neither filled 
with hate of another tribe nor of Europeans. Their apparent 
willingness to accept the formerly despised Bushmen as 
equal citizens is a hallmark of tolerance. 
The Bechuanas' Texas-size (225,ooo square miles) arid 
territory contains about 500,000 to 600,ooo people (by 
recent estimate of the Queen's Commissioner after a pilot 
census-almost double earlier figures) and 1,325,000 head 
of cattIe. Whereas Texas, with its open plains and cities, 
averages 28 people per square mile, Bechuanaland has a 
low-density ratio of only about 2, a major hindrance to 
development. The population is gg per cent African, with 
approximately 3,000 whites, ~ ,ooo Euro-Africans, and 250 
Asians. As far back as I 92 I ,  there were I ,700 whites against 
an estimated 150,000 Africans. Although the percentage 
of Europeans is insignificant, they are mostly settled along 
the line of rail in the best watered part of eastern Bechuana- 
land, and have been responsible for the development of 
nearly all the commercial enterprises. The Bechuana are 
also concentrated mainly in the eastern part of the territory. 
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The largest towns are Kanye, with approximately 30,000 
Africans, and Serowe, with 16,000 Africans. Francistown 
has the largest number of Europeans (r,ooo), and is the 
main commercial centre, now being rivalled by Lobatsi, 
which is also the temporary legislative capital and site of the 
slaughterhouse. Other towns along the eastern line of rail 
southward are Fapaye, Mahalapye and the future capital, 
Gaberones. 
Among the lands where Europeans have settled are the 
Lobatsi, Gaberones and Tuli blocks in the east, where the 
chiefs ceded land in connection with the railway in 1895, 
and the Tati Concession on the noi-th-east border with 
Southern Rhodesia. European farmers also have land rights 
in the far west Ghanzi settlement under an agreement 
engineered by Cecil Rhodes in 1899 and extended by the 
Bechuanaland Government in 1959. I t  is against these some- 
what loose arrangements that the gestation of Bechuanaland 
nation-building must be considered. 
Bechuar~aland takes its name from many closely-related 
Bantu tribes known collectively as the Bechuana, and all 
speaking Sechuana or, in an alternative spelling, Tswana. 
Among the tribal territories, the Bamangwato is the largest 
(44,341 square miles), and has about one-third of the total 
population. The next largest are the Bakwena, Bangwaketse, 
and Batawana territories. Ethnically, the African population 
is more heterogeneous than that of the other two High 
Commission Territories. The tribal territories are all 
held by subdivisions of the most important tribal group- 
the Bechuanas-most of whom entered the territory from 
the Transvaal in the first half of the I 8th century. 
Bakgatla people live on both sides of the Transvaal border, 
but have separate chiefs, although the Bakgatla chief in the 
B.P. claims over-all rule. A majority of the Barolong actually 
live in the Republic of South Africa, and the tribal head- 
quarters has long been Mafeking, on the Republican side 
of the border. Other Bantu groups include Koba from 
Northern Rhodesia, Merero from South West Africa, some 
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Southern Rhodesian peoples, and the long-resident Kgala- 
gadi. The Bushmen are primarily significant ethnologically. 
Almost all of the non-Bechuana Africans are under the 
tribal control, not always happily, of the Bechuana chiefs. 
Physical Geography 
The lives of the people of the territory are closely inter- 
woven with their physical surroundings. To understand 
them, one must begin with the underlying geology. 
Beneath the surface of the territory is a huge depression 
in the basement rock which has been filling with sediment 
and volcanic ash since pre-Cambrian times. On top of this, 
varying from 300 feet in the north to ~ o o  feet in the south, 
are the Kalahari sands. On the east, substantial areas of 
exposed schists and sedimentary rocks form a complex 
pattern. Likely mineral finds include hematite, gold, nickel, 
copper, and diamonds, but so far 90 per cent of the limited 
mineral production has been asbestos. Seams of medium 
quality coal have been found. 
The territory, at  an average elevation of 3,300 feet, is 
exceptionally flat, and 84 per cent is covered by sparse grass 
and a thornbush savannah. However, dunes occur only in 
the extreme southwest, and it is erroneous to describe 
Bechuanaland as a desert. The rainfall is only about 18 
inches a year, with a maximum around 27 inches in the 
north, down to under 10 inches in the Kalahari. Rain which 
does come falls in the summer between October and April. 
The lack of running water and of underground supplies 
derives, in part, from the fine texture of the sands. These 
hold the limited precipitation near the surface and provide 
moisture for long periods. The climate is sub-tropical, 
moderated by the elevation and low humidity. Winter 
nights are cool with occasional frost, and the hot summers 
are tempered by a prevailing north-east breeze in the late 
evening. 
There are hills in the north, east, and west, and water 
courses are formed in the better rains. At various periods 
in the past, the rainfall was much heavier, and a whole 
ancient river system can be seen in the landscape. In this 
fossil system of a thousand years ago or more, the Molopo 
and Nossob Rivers, now rarely holding water, cut their way 
hundreds of feet below the plain. Water, then, is the chief 
factor limiting economic growth today. Permanent water is 
found only in the Okavango River and its huge swamps in 
the northwest. Later we will discuss the studies of its flow, 
now largely lost through evaporation and transpiration, 
which might be used both for irrigation near the present 
swamps, channelled in canals, or put into existing dry river 
systems. 
Soils in the less sandy parts of the territory are not very 
fertile, but in the Tuli block and the Tati concession they 
would support excellent crops with a high return if they had 
water. However, experienced scientists have warned against 
allowing inexpert European or African cattle men to graze 
large parts of the Kalahari, lest a delicately balanced 
equilibrium of nature be destroyed for hundreds of years by 
even moderately heavy browsing. 
Kalahari Desert 
The Kalahari is the most famous and dominant physical 
feature of the B.P., yet it is subject to wide misunderstanding. 
I t  is substantially a desert if one means deserted by people. 
I t  does have some sand dunes in the south-west, but very 
little of it would be usable in a Hollywood 'Beau Geste' film. 
Adequate vegetation to support wild animals and even 
domesticated cattle is found in nearly all parts of the Kala- 
hari. Criss-crossing it recently by small plane at  IOO feet 
elevation, I circled a lone giraffe in the centre of a huge 
salt pan in what was almost the geographical dead centre 
of the Kalahari. But he did not appear weak, and grazing 
was available a few miles on. Actually, as one drives west- 
wards across the Kalahari from Lobatsi to Ghanzi, the land 
becomes distinctly drier on approaching Ghanzi. But it is 
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here that the cattle population builds up, and some f a m e r ~  
have grown wealthy on their livestock. 
The key to the Kalahari being a desert is not sand or lack 
of vegetation, but lack of surface water. The gemsbuck and 
other game survive in their tens of thousands because of an 
ability to lick up the dew and to extract liquids f?om what 
they eat. The nomadic Bushmen are famed for their use of 
the t s a m a  melon. I t  contains liquid, and slakes the thirst 
of the Bushmen, but it is not recommended for westernised 
stomachs, short of deathly thirst. Tt is more akin to drinking 
very bitter lemon juice than to the usual breakfast melon. 
The Brashmen are also known Ik7r their unique ability to 
suck up water from a damp piece of ground by inserting a 
straw. They transfer mouthfuls of water to gourds and will 
generously offer it to a stranger. 
Ghanzi survives as a farming area in one of the drier parts 
of the Kalahari because of the presence ofa  limestone ridge 
and water lying as close as fifty feet below the surface. In 
most parts of the Malahari, given deep water, one could 
establish cattle stations with a higher carrying capacity 
than some parts of Arizona or the Australian outback, where 
cattle are run. 
Thus, the image of the Kalahari as a barren waste is 
erroneous, a conclusion that visiting scientists have been 
reaching every decade since 1890. I t  is the 'great thirstland'. 
The innumerable stories of man and beast dying for lack of 
water, and of the maddening rush of oxen hot on the scent 
of water ahead after days in the Kalahari, were true, just 
as they were true for much of the Great American Desert in 
the western United States. To drive cattle from Ghanzi 
400 miles to the Lobatsi Abattoir is still a hard task fraught 
with potential danger. Men are occasionally mauled by 
lions, and those who venture OK the regular routes risk 
death by thirst. But one can already see the hand of man 
taming this vast waterless expanse. 
11, GESTATION OF A NATION 
WHAT territorial unity the B.P. (Bechuanaland Roeec- 
torate) does possess is due, as much as any single factor, to 
Khama IBI, a remarkable individual leader, who became 
chief of the Bamangwato in 1872. The previous fifty years 
bad been disastrous for his group and for Bechuana groups 
generally. Not only had many of them been pushed out of 
the Transvaal by the forces set in motion by impis (regiments) 
of Sbaka Zulu; they were o f  en raided by the Zulu break- 
aways under Mzilikazi, the tribe now known as the Matabele 
in Southern Rhodesia. But a major weakness was the in- 
ternal dissension of the Tswana groups. In 1820, Robert 
MoEat of the London Missionary Society established a post 
at  Kuruman, but his assistance brought peace to only a 
small area. A broader peace followed when ChiefKbama %I1 
organised military forces sufficient to deter Mzilikaziss 
successor, kobengula, from attacking the stronger Becbuana 
groups. Khama 111 was a staunch Christian axid virtually 
prohibited alcohol. As a strong adrarinistrator, he further 
reorganised the tribal life his father had begun to h i t  
together, as had the chiefs of other shattered tribes. 
Britain has guaranteed Bechuanaland's territorial integ- 
rity for many decades now. However, one must recall that 
around I 884. one ofthe Barolong chiefs, Montshiwa, pleaded 
in vain for promised protection. Groups of Boer 'free- 
booters' from the Transvaal kept moving into his lands, 
stopping and searching travellers, ploughing fields, and 
threatening to use cannon bought in Pretoria against 
anyone who interfered. The Transvaal Republic was clearly 
on the side of the Boers outside its borders, and of a group 
of Bechuana allies. Britain struggled ineffectually to help 
protect the pro-British Bechuana chiefs from encroachment. 
These were the days of the Republic of Stellaland, centred 
on Vryhearg, and nor& of it the biblically-inspired 'Land 
sf Goshen" In  a series of compromises, the Bechuana tribes 
lost the great part of what would be the most productive 
part of their Bands, and the border moved northwards. 
What had been the British Crown Colony of British Rechea- 
analand since 1885-that is, south of the present-day border 
a t  the Molopo River plus the Stellaland and Goshen 
Republics-became part of tlie Cape Colony. As a result, 
the Barolongs are split by the southern B.P. border, and the 
chief actually lives in South Africa. What the Bechuanas 
gained-perhaps salvaged is a better description-was a full 
'Protectorate' status from Her Majesty's Government which 
has stood the test of time. 
The resolution of the struggle over what was once Bechu- 
analand involved, first of all, the clash between Paul 
Kruger's South African Republic (Transvaal) and Cecil 
Rhodes' Gape Colony. Not only did Rhodes want northern 
Bechuanaland, but he wanted access to it and to the 
Rhodesias for trade and missionaries by outflanking the 
Transvaal on the east. Although J. 6. van NiekerSc, in 
setting up Stellaland, had a soundly organised and poten- 
tially properous country, its strategic position led to growing. 
pressure. Van Niekerk arranged to join with Goshen and to 
seek protection from the Transvaal. 
Intervention by newly colonial-minded Germany tipped 
the scales toward a vigorous and successful push by Great 
Britain and complicated political geography in southern 
Africa. In 1884, Germany proclaimed its protectorate over 
the Namaqua-Damaraland coast. The European powers 
were jockeying for position and trading claims in most parts 
of Africa. The threat presented to Britain was the linking-up 
of the Germans in South West Africa with their Boer fuiends 
in the South African Republic. Plans were made for a rail- 
road east from Luderitz. Cecil Rhodes saw this political 
bond as a permanent barrier to the north of the Cape, but. 
it was rivalry in the broader continental sphere which 
stiEened the British spine. Meanwhile Germany gained 
subsbntialy in Toga, Cameroons, as well as elsewhere. 
British concern for Bechuanaland as part of a power struggle 
Bed to a commitment to the British South Africa Company 
that it could veto any ast-w~e~t German railway crossing 
kchuanaland, 
Subsequent rail competition led to h e  creation of the 
Caprivi Zipfel north of Bechuanaland from South West 
Mrica to the Rhodeslas. This long appendage now looh 
anachronistic on the modern map of Africa, not unlike an 
unneeded appendix, but at the time it was crucial to 
German plans to cross Africa by rail from east to west. After 
decades of manoeuvering, Germany failed to cross Africa, 
and Rhodes' dream of an all-British route from south to 
north did not come true. 
The Caprivi Strip is about 30 miles in width and 300 miles 
Bong, and is named for Count Caprivi, the German Chanc- 
ellor and successor to Bismarck. Its creation formed part 
of the Anglo-Geraxran Convention of 1890. This included 
the cession to Germany of Heligoland, and a number of 
African agreements involving the Volta River, Togoland, 
Cameroons, the East African coast, and British protection 
of Zanzibar. The Caprivi Strip gave Germany access to the 
upper reaches of the Zambezi, and thus potential but never 
realised trade routes in central Africa. Its strategic signifi- 
cance was never appreciated in the last century. It is dificult 
of access and consists mostly of swamp, flooded river, and a 
few islands towards its apex, where the Zambesi and Ghobe 
Rivers converge. I t  is administered directly from the 
Republic of South Africa, separately from South West 
Africa, of which it is actually a part. It  is possible that the 
Zipfel's long borders with both Angola and Bechuanaland 
will play an important role as political pressures increase 
in this part of Africa, 
To return to Bechuanaland, once Britain had thwarted 
the South African Republic and the Germans it was by no 
means certain that Bechuanaland would remain a separate 
territory. Lord de Villiers, President of the National 
Convention, wrote to General Smuts in 1908, five we& 
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before the Convention in Durban, and suggested giving all 
of Bechuanaland to the Transvaal. But, despite the widely 
held assumption that Bechuanaland, Swaziland, and 
Basutoland would have been handed over in due course to 
South Africa, Britain resisted demands for doing so im- 
mediately. The historian Eric Walker believes that unless it 
had been understood that the Territories would eventually 
be transferred, Britain would have refused union in 1910. 
The history of these relationships is outlined in greater 
detail by Lord Hailey in his The Republic of South Africa and 
the High Commission Territories (Oxford University Press, 
1963).- 
From this historical sketch it is clear that Bechuanaland's 
strategic position in the political battieground of southern 
Africa today is a continuation of a century-old role, but with 
two main differences. The first of these is that no longer do 
European states propose and dispose with new African 
countries, and the second, that never before have the 
Bechuanas been in a position to affect the outcome. The 
emergence of modern Bechuana leadership, albeit often 
with traditional charismatic overtones, marks a new phase 
in Bechuanaland history. 
Seretse Khama's marriage 
Probably the key figure in the B.P. today is Seretse 
Khama. We shall come later to his political role, but now 
our historical survey would be incomplete without reference 
to the political difficulties which arose from his marriage 
in September 1948 to Miss Ruth Williams. Seretse Khama 
was heir to the Bamangwato Chieftainship, and a law stud- 
ent at  the Inner Temple in London. His academic career 
began in tribal schools and went on in South African 
institutions to a B.A. While at Oxford, he was chosen to 
play rugby (under a South African captain) for Balliol. 
Ruth Williams had a middle class background, four years 
in the Women's Auxiliary Air Force and, at  the time of her 
marriage, was a confidential clerk to an undemrites at  
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Eloyds. One mentions this because the label 'London 
typist', with implications of little education, social status 
and responsibility, was unfairly pinned on her in contem- 
porary Press accounts. 
The Regent of the Bamangwato at the time was Tshekedi 
Khama, who had ruled for twenty-three years. He was 
strongly against the marriage. An intelligent and able man 
of tremendous drive, and a real autocrat, Tshekedi was 
Seretse9s uncle. However, he had been in loco parentis for 
many years, and was normally addressed as 'father9 by 
Seretse. When Tshekedi was married in 1936, his fifteen- 
year-old nephew, Seretse, was the best man. 
In I 933, Tshekedi tried a white man for an offence against 
an African. Under statutes dating back to 1891, neither 
Tshekedi nor any other chief with judicial power had the 
right to try any white man. The man in question was none- 
too-savoury a character, and the Regent had strong moral 
justification. This was a cause cil2bre for southern Africa of this 
period and roused strong emotions among Europeans and, 
indeed, many Africans who wanted a change. The British 
Government, even if sympathetic with Tshekedi in this 
particular case, felt it could not accept such a flouting of 
regulations. Tshekedi displayed his iron determination and 
refused to follow British wishes. Finally, the acting High 
Commissioner, Vice-Admiral Evans, called for 200 marines 
and sailors from a British warship in Cape Town, and 
marched this naval force across the sand to Serowe to 
enforce Britain's will upon Tshekedi. 
In his resolute fight against the marriage in 1948, Tshekedi 
brought pressure on Seretse through the British Govern- 
ment and the London Missionary Society, and through a 
barrage of cables putting forth his own objections and also re- 
flecting an undetermined amount of tribal feeling. Tshekedi's 
initial success was simply to block a religious wedding when 
successive Anglican clergy got cold feet under pressure from 
superiors, but this did not stop the civil marriage. I t  was the 
first round in what Sir Winston ChurchilI described in the 
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House of Commons as h very disreputable transactionna 
His specific criticism was of Tshekedi's banishment, but it 
might apply to the whole series of episodes. 
Considerable wrath was directed at  a manoeuvre through 
which Seretse Khama and his wife were invited to London 
from Eechuanaland, where they had gone to live while the 
question of the chieftainship was thrashed out. Ruth 
Khama refused to go lest Seretse somehow be forced to 
choose between his tribe and his wife. Her suspicions 
seemed well-grounded when she received a cable from 
Seretse in London: 'Tribe and myself tricked by British 
Government stop Am banned from whole Protectorate 
stop Love Seretse'. 
Without recapitulating a long hearing at Lobatsi, starring 
Tshekedi Ichama, a fight between Bamangwato tribesmen 
and the police in the kcgotla (meeting place) in which three 
African police were ItiIled and twelve injured, and various 
manoeuvres to keep Seretse and Ruth Khama apart, the 
upshot was that the Mhamas eventually settled in Addis- 
cornbe, Groydon, for a lengthy stay. The tribe was governed 
by RaseboIai Mgamane, an experienced soldier, as head of 
the African Authority. An Order in Council declared 'that 
neither Seretse Khama nor Tshekedi Khama nor their 
children shall hereafter be eligible to be chief, or acting chief, 
or regent of the tribe, or to be a member of a council of 
regency of the tribe, or to summon the tribe in kgotla for 
any purpose, or to preside or exercise any of the functions 
of the president of any Icgotla of the tribe9. The same policy 
was envisaged by the Conservative Government which 
succeeded Labour and which did not at  the time lift the 
ban on the Khamas. I t  is probably true that no official 
written representations were ever made by South Africa. 
However, the writer accepts the views of responsible mem- 
bers of both British parties that at  the time the possible 
repercussions from South Africa about the inter-racial 
marriage did weigh heavily with the British Government. 
A great deal of water has subsequently Wowed down the 
Zambesi. In many ways, the National Party Government in 
South Mrica has matured in office and with the confidence 
of three successive victories at the polls, and it seems that 
a Bess rigid stand. is taken on such matters as inter-racial 
liaisons. Even internally, the Immorality Act, which 
tragically caught In its clutches so many men including 
some prominent in public life? was not so stringently 
enforced by 1963. This is not easily proved but it is the 
writer's considered opinion that a tacit agreement now 
prevails to go slow on attempting to uncover, and to 
prosecute, any except flagrant cases. There has been a 
marked d r o ~  in the number of cases mentioned in the Press. 
We will discuss subsequently relations between South 
Africa and the B.P., but suffice it to say that given a similar 
case today, British action would be much less--if at all--- 
influenced by South African views. 
And whaiare the views of people in Bechuanaland with 
the passage of time and the death, in 1959, of Tshekedi? 
Among the Bamangwato, Seretse Khama, long since back 
in his home in Serowe, has almost all the charismatic 
attraction he would have as chief. He has the political 
advantages of ( I )  not being bothered with the many time- 
consuming duties of a chief, (2) not being forced to make 
petty decisions which might create animosity against him 
in the tribe, and (3) being accepted by most of the chiefs of 
the B.P. as virtually a chief with strong political backing 
and without losing the common touch he may need to 
compete with the Bechuanaland People's Party. He can 
disavow rigidly traditionalist decisions by chiefs without 
being disloyal to chieftainship. 
In late 1963 it was announced that Rasebolai wished to 
retire after ten years of valuable service. I t  was agreed that 
the eldest son of Tshekedi Khama, Leapeetswe Khama, 
should be appointed head of the African Authority replacing 
Rasebolai Kgamane, and the change was made at a kgotla 
in January rg64. The suspension of the Chieftainship was 
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continued, but it was specifically stated by the Government 
&sat in view of the wishes of the tribe, Seretse Khama" sons 
were not excluded from the Chiefainship when they came 
of age. This mealas that sporadic criticbm of the Kharmhe 
sans on the racial grounds that tihey are only %halP--Mrimbz9 
has been overcome, 
Ruth Rhama has gained wide respect from the Bamang- 
wato. Her handling of many traditional roles has solidified 
her position with some traditionalists. The tribe know her 
as aperson and not as a "white woman" and they like her. 
,Lbnsong the Bamanpato tribesmen, there is a growing 
sentiment that the Khamasheldest boy-now away at a 
formerly all-European school in Bulawayo---should some- 
day become chief. Opposition might also be strong, but the 
tide has turned in favour of the Khamas. While they have 
established themselves personally, what is more important 
is the westernisation of the B a m n p a t o  Reserve and the 
B.P. generally. In the sixteen years since the dispute broke 
out, the Bechuana in general have become more sophisti- 
cated. Seretse used to stand out because of his European 
dress and habits. Now he looks Bike manv an African s&d- 
ing alongside him at a cocktail bar, except for better 
tailoring. What African racialism there may have been 
directed against Ruth Khama has lessened in the B.P., 
despite a greater consciousness of racial conflict elsewhere 
and the rise of nationalism. 
And what of the Europeans in the B.P.? Seretse Khama 
is downright popular. British sportsmen speak of his sense 
of humour on the cricket field, and administrators of his 
common sense. He is a friend and confidant of European 
officials. Mrikaner farmers spoke warmly of him to me. 
They stood up and cheered a i  a political meeting where he 
explained his views. His sense of humour does as much as 
anything to endear him to Europeans. Some of his humor- 
ous comments4ven poking fun at himself-would sound 
odd in Britain, but they are appreciated in the B.P. A 
secoxld factor commented on by many Europeans is a 
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complete lack of bitterness, as far as his casual friends could 
see. One or two British oflicials-a new generatior1 in the 
higher posts-have a sense of guilt over the past, but 
as they were not higher-ups then, they do not find this a 
barrier. Europeans with strong racial prejudice still live 
in the B.P., but even in this group Seretse Khama is held 
in high respect and even esteem. Curiously, one factor cited 
by several Europeans who are anti-Mican, but favour 
Seretse, is his devotion to his wife. 
Ruth Khama has had a hard row to hoe with many 
official wives as well as with the white women generally in 
the Protectorate. Her own sense of dignity and good 
manners, and her obvious devotion to her husband and 
children, have been the major factors in her genuine 
acceptance by the wives of British officials. They had no 
alternative but to accept her outwardly, but Mrs. Khama 
herself gained the inward approval. This issue always seems 
one-sided. By what right are 'they' judging her, whoever 
" h e y h a y  be? A more important question, perhaps, is 
whether she, as the wife of the most influential African 
leader, is willing to accept 'them'. However, one must also 
note that in non-official, white circles, Mrs. Khama is 
respected. Among Afrikaner women, respect was summed 
up in one remark by a more or less typical huisvrou (house- 
wife): Well, you know what we think about things like 
that, but you know I saw her at  the Francistown show last 
month and she is an awfully nice person." 
Although Seretse Mhama is still prohibited in South 
Africa, his marriage is far from a public issue. Indeed, his 
plane was diverted once during 1963, and he landed at  
Jan Smuts Airport. Calls to various ministries revealed no 
antagonism, but some confusion about what to do. In the 
end, Seretse Khama had lunch at  the British High Gom- 
mission in Pretoria, and motored back to Bechuanaland, 
This incident was never discussed in the Pres  and had no 
sepereussions~ 
To sum u~ in common ~Pmrases which reveal a certah 
racialism in European languages, in a decade in Bechuana- 
land Seretse Khama had changed &om the bdte naira of 
whites and, indeed, of South Africans, to their 'white 
hope2 for moderate, economically progressive African rde.  
From Non-Incorporation to Political Parties 
Until 1948, when the National Party came to power in 
South Africa, it was widely assumed that Bechuanaland 
would be incorporated into the then Union of South Africa. 
One can summarise an involved legal history by saying that 
at  the founding of a Union of South Africa in 19x0, it seemed 
only a matter of time until the incorporation provided for 
took place. Indeed, throughout the 193os, Prime Minister 
J. B. M. Hertzog pressed in various ways for the final 
incorporation. This has not taken place because the 
inhabitants of none of the three territories have ever seemed 
willing to be incorporated. No British Government would 
or will hand over the territories to South Africa against 
the will of the inhabitants. The image created by the 
National Party since 1948 has killed the prospect of 
incorporation. 
A second event from which to date an inci~ient Bechuana- 
land sense of nationhood was economic. As mentioned, until 
a956 this desperately poor territory was financially on its 
own. The British Government asked itself the rhetorical 
question: W h y  spend British taxpayers' money to build up 
a territory someone else is going to take over?' But by the 
late rq5os, the contrast between the virtual void in public 
servicesfor Bechuanaland and the appalling state of African 
education, roads, health services, etc., compared with the 
relatively superior provisions for Africans within the Union 
of South Africa, had not only drawn a large percentage 
of the ablest Bechuanas across the border to South Africa, 
but made the rural slum of Bechuanaland a poor platform 
from which to criticise the Union. If incorporation was out, 
then Britain would be judged guilty of appalling neglect of 
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her seYEdesipated colonial responsibilities. It was !&om 
these motives that the U.K. Treasury finally gave a modest 
transfusion to the anaemic Bechuanaland budget. 
Although incorporation was no longer a prospect after 
1948, it was not until a third key date, Sharpeville in 1960, 
that all informed people in the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
finally concluded that incorporation was out of the question. 
While blood had begun to flow in the financial arteries 
of the B.P., the events triggered by the shooting at  Sharpe- 
ville led to stronger measures against African nationalist 
groups in South Africa and, in turn, to a steady stream of 
refugees across the boundary to Bechuanaland. Between 
1960 and 1964, the number totalled some 1,400. The B.P. 
bas had far more South African refugees than Swaziland 
or Basutoland. The refugee route north from Lobatsi to 
Francistown and on to Tanganyika has become fairly 
routine, while an easy outlet from the other High Com- 
mission Territories is still not available. 
The refugees as a group played the decisive role in the 
beginning of indigenous political movements in the B.P. 
from a960 onwards. Not that refugees played a major role 
themselves, but through numerous contacts and discussions 
with them, local Bechuanas developed the Bechuanaland 
People" Party (B.P.P.). Of course, then as now, analysis of 
refugees by the Bechuanaland Government suggests that 
only a small percentage of 'refugees' flee for genuine political 
reasons; many are merely seeking escape from dissatis- 
factions or complications in their personal life, and try to 
take advantage of the political asylum offered. This type of 
refugee created a bad name in the B.P. as in Tanganyika. 
Likewise, some of the white Communists, most of whom 
did not reach the B.P. until 1963, antagonised even the 
most militant Bechuanas with a callous disregard of the 
B.P.'s best interests. 
Under stimulus from Africans of the Re~ubl ic  of South 
Africa and encouraged by a little more money moving in 
the territory, various Bechuana groups came rapidly to 
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conceive of their country as a potential nation. Following a 
year after the Bechuanaland People's Party was the Bechu- 
analand Democratic Party (B.D.P.). Led by Seretse Khama, 
it is probably the most popular party in the B.P. today. Both 
of these parties have effectively preached a B.P. nationalism. 
I tested this one time in remote Ngamiland by talking with 
a group of illiterate and barely literate B.P.P. supporters in 
Maun. They preached equality of all within the B.P. 1 
wondered about the Bushmen (Masarwaf to the Bechuana), 
who have been treated as little more than animals by most 
of the Bantu. 'Do you mean to tell me that the Masarwa can 
go to school with your children, become officials, and even 
marry into your family ?' The men addressed hesitated and 
swallowed, until one said: k h  . . . eh . . . Yes, they are 
people just like the rest of us, and everyone in the B.P. must 
be fair men.' This and many other encounters convince me 
that the two parties have been extraordinarily successful in 
overcoming traditional antagonisms and building towards 
a B.P. citizenship. To be sure, there will be bitter Bushman- 
Bantu rivalries and faction fights among the Bechuana 
tribes. But these will not approach the bitterness of tribal 
antagonisms in, say, the Congo or Kenya. 
The organisation of political parties is no idle exercise, 
because the fruits of office are there for the winning. Some 
African political party will have substantial control of the 
internal affairs of Bechuanaland before the end of 1965. 
Such control could be greater than what is now envisaged, 
and come sooner. 
Bechuanaland People's Party 
The first political party to be organised (in 1961 for 
practical purposes) was the Bechuanaland People's Party. 
The nominal leader is K. T. Motsete. He was a man of 
Technically a particular tribe of Bushmen with some Bantu ad- 
mixture. The Masarwa attach themselves to Bechuana cattle owners 
in a serf-and-master arrangement. 
consideradbPe promise when, following secorldaq schooling 
in South Africa, he went to London with the assistance of 
the Carnegie Corporation and took a series of degrees in 
the early 1930s. Motsete is respected in Bechuanaland as a 
man of learning, but a fair assessment is that he has never 
lived up to his promise. He has great personal charm; 
however, he seems sometimes to lack intellectual sharpness, 
and, indeed, political acumen. When 1 asked him how the 
B.P.P. differed from the Bcchuanaland Democratic Party, 
he replied, "R7ell, we aren't really very different,, an answer 
which would never satisfy his vigorous lieutenants. He is 
an amiable figurehead, and by nature more of a B.D.P. man. 
The driving force in the party is Vice-Chairman Matante. 
I talked with him in his Francistown home shortly after his 
return from Moscow. His visit there was so~nething of a 
mystery because Matante has always followed a strong anti- 
communist line, even when an expression of such views 
seemed irrelevant. Actually, it seems that the whole visit 
was a colossal mistake: someone else, a woman with a 
similar name, had been invited to an international women's 
gathering in Moscow. Thus, no one was prepared for the 
dynamic leader of the B.P.P. According to Matante, he 
did not see any of the key people in Moscow who are con- 
cerned with Mrica, and did not even talk freely with 
African students at  Patrice Lumumba University. He 
visited it and saw a few buildings and talked with one 
African student through an interpreter. Some effort was 
made by members of the Afi-o-Asian Solidarity Committee 
to brighten his visit, but it was a dreary mistake. 
The apparent Soviet assessment of Matante is under- 
standable. He is far from the class of leaders elsewhere in 
Africa. One can easily be in error, but I did not feel he 
had the qualities for success which such present-day leaders 
as Nkrumah, Mboya and hiyerere had in the days when 
they were first organising anti-colonial parties. Nevertheless, 
Matante is superb on the soapbox, and has a shrewdness 
which stands out in Bechuanaland. 
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It is interesting to compare him and Mburumba Kerina, 
the South West Africa leader. Both Kerina and his hand- 
some wife from Los Angeles, and their American-born 
children, were staying with Matante when I visited him. 
Kerina has a wide grasp of the political spectrum. On the 
other hand, Matante seemed unable to sort out the relative 
strengths in America of the Black Muslims, Lawson9s 
African Nationalists, and the 'Back to Afi-ica9 movement 
within the whole Negro protest movement, appearing to 
believe that the 'Back to Africa9 movement was one of the 
strongest. 
At the present time, it is difficult to assess the strength of 
breakaway B.P.P. leader Nlpho. His political views are to 
the left of Matante; he is a vigorous personality. His follow- 
ing is now limited, but this could change in a matter of' 
weeks. In general, the Mpho splinter section has associated 
itself with the African National Congress, whereas the 
Matante segment has been closer to the Pan-Afi-icanist 
Congress. 
The B.P.P. is poor. Money from Ghana for a Land Rover 
and loudspeaker equipment was a significant factor in its 
initial success. Now there is squabbling over the dispersal 
of the limited Ghanaian funds and a general state of 
executive uncertainty. Nothing like the close comradeship 
of the early C.P.P. in Ghana exists. The comparatively 
small but most politically conscious urban population, 
particularly the poor and unemployed, are for the B.P.P. 
Waiters in the Francistown hotels spoke unanimously for 
the B.P.P. as the 'poor man's party' against the 'rich men'. 
In a Francistown African beer hall, I found no supporters 
of the B.D.P., although, if there were a few, they may have 
feared intimidation. The B.P.P. would probably sweep an 
election slate in Francistown, Lobatsi, and some of the 
smaller towns. 
The mercurial nature of Bechuanaland politics may mean 
that whole parties die and new ones are born in a matter of 
months. President Motsete and Vice-President Matante 
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have argued vigorously in private, and have even ventilated 
ill. feelings in the pages of the Mafeking Mail (August I 963). 
Granted the role of charisma in B.P. politics, and the 
political leverage of small sums of money, new leaders may 
be expected to rise rapidly from the ranks. 
Bechz~alzaland Democratic Par9 
This party also believes in 'one man, one vote'. I t  did not 
stand with the B.P.P. for independence in 1964, but rather 
'as soon as possible'. I t  is the party of political moderation 
and, somewhat, of the 'haves'-those Africans who have 
education or wealth or traditional authority. In most 
African situations, the teachers, traders, and chiefs are 
outvoted by the mass, but not always: not, for instance, in 
northern Nigeria, another cattle-owning part of Africa. 
B.D.P. leader Seretse Khama is a man of outstanding 
ability. There is a maiitle around him from his famous 
grandfather, Chief Khama, and from his even more able, 
if hard-headed, uncle, Tshekedi Mharna, with whom 
Seretse had so bitter a struggle. As we have seen Seretse is 
not the chief of his tribe, and although it is likely that 
the British would withdraw the bar to this if asked, he is 
probably too wise to accept the chieftainship. He is one of 
the most progressive men in Bechuanaland, and is popular 
with African teachers and businessmen. As such, he regularly 
clashes with the chiefs in African Council and in the legis- 
lature. When it comes to voting in a general election, 
however, Seretse Khama cou1.d certainly count upon the 
support of the chiefs and upon the many thousands of 
tribesmen who will take their cues from their traditional 
leaders. For some chiefs with whom Seretse clashes, he is 
obviously the 'least bad' candidate for Prime Minister. His 
birth, experience and sense of responsible leadership make 
him attractive to the traditionalists. 
But it would be a mistake to assume that Seretse Khama 
is the most active politician in the Democratic Party. That 
description fits his highly intelligent and effective No. 2 
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man, Quett Masire. I t  is Masire who has visited Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Ghana and elsewhere for political discussions with 
African leaders. I attended a three-day meeting of the 
African Council in Lobatsi, and the best and most cogent 
speeches were made by Quett Masire, a man in his early 
thirties, and thus junior to most of the members. John 
Banda, Parliamentary Secretary for Education in Northern 
Rhodesia, describes Masire: 'He was the brightest boy in 
our class in South Africa, and we all expected him to be a 
brilliant scholar.' 
Masire is a member of Chief Bathoen's Bankwaketse 
tribe. Bathoen is the strongest chief among his peers and has 
often clashed with the young progressives such as Masire. 
At one stage, he stripped Masire of most of his land and 
rights, and tried to banish him to a distant part of the 
reserve. Pressure from Seretse Khama and the British 
Government smoothed this over. Bathoen is far from 
completely reactionary towards change, and is proud that 
at  Kanye he has the cleanest town in the B.P. and the best 
hospital. For a time, Bathoen and his fellow chiefs stayed 
away from modern politics and used their considerable powers 
to run affairs their own way. They are somewhat scared 
now, and form the right wing of the B.D.P., although 
clashes continue with Seretse Khama over the pace at which 
tribal traditions should be adjusted to modern conditions. 
Khama, Masire, and Bathoen are all key figures in the 
Bechuanaland Legislature. 
Attitude of the B.P. Administration 
In  addition to having probably a slight majority of African 
support in the B.P., and having the support of nearly all 
European, Indian, and Coloured residents, the Bechuana- 
land Democratic Party is the clear favourite of the British 
Administration. However, one must immediately express 
the conviction that election procedures and ballot counting 
will be scrupulously fair, and that if the B.P.P. can muster 
majority support, it will take over the Government. 
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The British Government might have wished to advance 
the probable date of internal African rule to earlier than Iate 
1965, but for various technical reasons such as census, 
delimitation, the new capital, and other considerations, 
it could not do so. Some observers see an earIy election as 
favouring the chances of the now surging B.D.P., but no 
favouritism on the part of I-Ier Majesty's Government can 
be seen. 
European Re-orientation 
African attitudes and goals are the inajor key to creating a 
Bechuanaland nation, but the Europeans, although small 
in number, also exercise a significant role in nation-building. 
Perhaps because they had a deeper sense of modern political 
units, the growth of a B.P. nationalism has been more 
marked among Europeans than among the vast majority 
of tribally-oriented Bechuanas. 
Until three years ago, European farmers and businessmen 
looked outward to some other political unit with which they 
felt a kinship. This was strongest in the isolated Ghanzi block, 
four hundred miles of terrible road from Lobatsi, across the 
Kalahari thirstland to the western border of the B.P. The 
Ghanzi farmers, mostly of Afrikaans origin, had their links 
across the border to Gobabis in South West Africa. l'heir 
mail and supplies came f o m  there. They sent their cream 
and cattle there for sale. Their children still attend boarding 
school in South West Africa or in South Africa. On the 
whole, I find from interviewing numerous farmers in the 
Ghanzi block that their allegiance is now evenly divided. 
Cream still goes to Gobabis, but cattle are trekked for up to 
two weeks to the Eobatsi abattoir. Mail is from the B.P. 
The new Bechuanaland Safaris' weekly air service has 
brought a marked psychological change of attitude. Ghanzi 
has no doctor for hundreds of miles, so when a man had his 
arm pulled out of the shoulder by a machine, he waited a day 
and then Aew two hours to Lobatsi. In another case, a man 
who had lost a leg to a lion was flown to Francistown for 
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treatment. Previously, injured people went to South West 
Africa. 
In I 898, Cecil John Rhodes granted 37 farms to Afrikaner 
farmers in the Ghanzi block. Not many of the original 
families are still there, and only a few of the Angolan 'trek 
boers' who returned from their self-imposed exile in Portu- 
guese territory to settle at Ghanzi. They are not happy 
about social integration. Although apprehensive, there are 
others among the three hundred Afrikaner farmers and a 
handful of English-speakers who are willing to think in 
terms of a Bechuanaland nation. They are not in a region 
of heavy African population, and have pioneered the 
country with the help of partially detribalised Bushmen. 
They talk more wistfully than practically of joining with 
South West Africa. Actually, their small numbers and isola- 
tion from the centres of influence in Bechuanaland work 
against their carrying much weight with the authorities or 
the authorities doing very much to them, be authority 
British or African. However, they were the only European 
group to resist school integration fully, and, in defiance, 
sent some fifty children to school out of Bechuanaland. 
If Ghanzi Europeans are now partially oriented towards 
Bechuanaland, the farmers in the Tuli and Gaberones 
blocks on the eastern border have also begun even more to 
look inward to Bechuanaland instead of exclusively outward 
to the Transvaal. While there are close family ties with the 
Republic, almost every farmer or merchant along the 
eastern line of rail has a growing feeling of identification 
with the B.P. Some are apprehensive again, but also proud 
of the territory's accomplishments in economics and in 
maintaining racial tranquillity. A stock fence on the 
Re~ublican side of the Transvaal-Tuli border has not onlv 
limited some movement in regard to grazing and water, 
but has been something of a psychological force as well. 
English- and Afrikaans-speaking farmers in the Tuli 
block, seven miles wide and three hundred miles long, had 
a resurgence of feeling for South Ali-ica in late 1963. 
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However, their late member on the Legislative Council, 
- 
L. van Gass, advised strongly against the proposal to set 
up a pro-South Africa white political party. Such a step 
would be wolitical suicide for local whites within an over- 
whelmingly Ahican country, and is unlikely to be viewed 
favourably by the South African authorities themselves, 
who have enough to do without struggling with Britain over 
more rights for such farmers than any citizen in the B.P. 
will be given. 
The Tati Concession, occupying the northeast part of the 
Protectorate, dates from a grant by the baatabele ch id  
Lobengula on 2 September 1880. I t  has always had close 
ties with Southern Rhodesia. Indeed, the Southern Rho- 
desian Government made official representations in the 
I ~ ~ O S ,  when South Africa was pressing for incorporation, to 
protect its legal position in the event of Bechuanaland being 
dismembered. The Tati Company owns most of Francis- 
town and tremendous blocks of farming land. In 1955, 
control of the company passed from London to Johannes- 
burg, where the Glazer Brothers' financial combine has its 
headquarters. At first, the new owners began insisting on 
legal, but largely lapsed, rights, and generally 'turned on 
the screws'. More recently, and largely as a result of 
Bechuanaland Government pressure, they have begun to 
ameliorate a few of the anachronistic arrangements. Some of 
u 
these involve the collection of taxes from African farmers, 
and on township building sites. The arrears of taxes grow 
in numerous categories. and the British Government would 
w 
be extremely reluctant to attempt to enforce collection. In 
fact, it has caused special legislation to be passed to enable 
the B.P. Government to take over the management of 
water and light in Francistown from the Tati Company. 
One curious sidelight: one house in Francistown is 
occupied by refugees. A private British group, 'The Joint 
Committee for the High Commission Territories', owns the 
house, but the Tati Company owns the land. The Company 
bas refused rent and demands that, the refugees he moved. 
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Since 1963, D. Mincher, a son-in-law of the late South 
African Prime Minister Field Marshal-J. C. Smuts, has been 
put in local charge of the company properties in the B.P. 
He is personally affable and able; local residents are 
awaiting experience to determine whether he has significant 
authority to solve thorny local problems. While it is true 
that in South Africa the evocation of the famous Boer leader 
and world statesman, Smuts, is impressive to English- 
speaking whites, the political times are such in Bechuana- 
land that African leaders, particularlv in the B.P.P.. do not 
, . 
make sharp distinctions between the National Party and the 
United Party in South Africa. General Smuts' reputation 
in the crushing of the Bondelswart rebellion. whether his 
- 
decisions are judged in a friendly or critical fashion, was not 
such as to inspire African enthusiasm. South African com- 
panies which may consider tl~emselves 'liberal9 in their ]local 
context often have difficulty adjusting to the present realities 
of modern Africa outside the Republic. 
To return to the Tati, there has been intermittent agita- 
tion on the part of some Europeans that it should join with 
Southern Rhodesia. This has ebbed away as the Federa- 
tion of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has collapsed, and the 
political tensions between blaclr and white in Southern 
Rhodesia have grown over the last five years. Early in 1963, 
a delegation of European farmers called upon their local 
member of the legislature with an eye to secession, but he 
convinced them that they did not want to join any other 
country, but really were asking for independence-an 
inlpracticable goal. By August 1963, the writer could find 
very little sentiment for either independence or for associa- 
tion with Southern Rhodesia. But while the feeling of being 
a part of Bechuanaland has grown steadily in the Tati 
Concession, the fear of an African Government continues to 
alarm some interests there. 
The opening of the new Mopani Club for all races startled 
some whites, although non-racial clubs seemed to an 
outsider not only natural but inevitable. A certain ostracism 
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of the then District Commissioner, Phillip Steenkamp, a 
Kenya-born Afrikaner, by members of the 'white club9 
because of his championing of the African cause, led to some 
tension between Steenkarnp and his colleagues in the 
Administration. 
A meeting in Francistown was addressed by a Pretoria 
lawyer, Lourens Beyers, who argued that the British 
Government has made the 1.324 million acres a white terri- 
tory by confirming the freehold ownership of concession land 
in 19 1 I.  One Tati farmer took the line in December I 963 
that 'Fifty years ago we voluntarily accepted British pro- 
tection; should Britain grant the Bechuanas independence, 
we can break away if we want to.' 
All talk of secession of European parts of the B.P., either 
for the purpose of joining with another white-dominated 
state or to form a pocket-size country, has been scorned by 
Seretse Khama, and is adamantly opposed by virtually all 
the chiefs and leading Bechuanas. 
In Bechuanaland as a whole there has been a remarkable 
surge of national consciousness since I 960. Further hesitation 
in European 'loyalty', and even foolish statements and minor 
actions by Europeans may be expected. That 'white' 
emotions towards the emerging nation are ambivalent is 
perhaps not surprising. But any serious moves would require 
the backing of a cautious South AiEican Government, as we 
shall see. Among the vast African majority, there is no 
group, tribe, or region which now wants to secede. The 
potential desire of the Hereros in Ngamiland to the north 
and west for affiliation with South West Africa has not 
developed. Unhappy as they are with Batawana rule in 
Maun and elsewhere, their desire is to return to South 
West, from whence they fled German wrath two generations 
ago, but does not include the physical linking up of their 
present lands with those of their brothers in South West. 
Some Angolan Africans prefer to live in Ngamiland near 
the Caprivi Strip border, but there is very little contact 
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across the Strip into Angola by Africans, private Europeans, 
or the British administration. 
In the light of this psychological 'raising of the bound- 
aries' of the territory, the location of the national capital 
at  the Imperial Reserve (Mafeking) in the Gape Province 
of South Africa becomes more anomalous than ever. 
Gaberones Capital 
Her Majesty's Commissioner Peter Fawcus and the 
British Government attach great political significance to 
the building from scratch of a new Bechuanaland capital 
at  Gaberones. The dam for an adequate water supply is 
under construction, and it is planned that the first transfers 
of departments should take place at  the beginning of 1965. 
While there is no legal discrimination in offices, family 
housing, sports, etc., in the Imperial Reserve at  Mafeking, 
the general pattern of discrimination in the town itself 
cannot fail to have its effect upon the relationships of 
African and European members of the Administration. 
Although the South African Government has leaned over 
backwards to accommodate the Territorial headquarters, 
and the movement of officials of all races to and from the 
B.P. is without hindrance, the situation remains a drag 
on felicitous race relations. For one thing, Seretse Khama 
is a member of the Executive Council of the Legislature. 
One reason weekly Exco meetings, as well as the periodic 
sessions of Legco itself, are held in Lobatsi is because 
Seretse Khama who is a member was named a prohibited 
immigrant to South Africa at  the time of his marriage. 
A second reason was a conscious desire on the part of 
Government to 'move into the Territory'. 
The loss of the Protectorate headquarters will be a sharp 
economic blow to the town of Mafeking. In its edition of 
30 June 1961 the Mafeking Mail proposed an exchange of 
land between Bechuanaland and South Africa. This was 
to create a corridor a few miles wide and sixteen miles long, 
to allow the headquarters site to become legally part of 
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the B.P. In exchange, land of comparable value would 
be given to South Africa towards South West Africa, 
where the border is not well drawn from a strategic view- 
point. ]I interviewed various responsible ofiicials, including 
the Mayor at that time, Mr. Frankel. (Mafeking is one 
of several predoiminantly Afrikaans towns which periodically 
have a Jewish Mayor.) While he personally would have 
liked to find a modus viuendi for retaining the B.P. admin- 
istration, the Mayor said the proposal had not even been 
seriously put to the South African authorities. 
The reason such an exchange was not favoured on the 
British side is that, even with a corridor, the location of 
the capital at the extreme southern tip of the Protectorate 
would perpetuate a sense of isolation between country and 
capital, and could not malie a positive political contribu- 
tion to a new national spirit. 
As plans are now developing for Gaberones, all racial 
barriers, which existed not only in the environment of 
Mafeking but traditionally almost as strongly throughout 
the territory, would be wiped away. In a new environment, 
the chances of encouraging non-racial social patterns wou-ld 
be enhanced. 
The need for this is evident when one studies the results 
of the recent legal desegregation in Bechuanaland. In 
Francistown hotels, for example, the European boycott of 
the better bars has faded away, but by one means or another 
the two racial groups have avoided each other in public 
places. 
Because of the persistence of olcler racial patterns in 
most parts of the B.P., the establishment of the new capital 
at Gaberones on a non-racial basis, and fairly near the 
centre of most tribes and population, promises to be a 
powerful force in the new sense of Bechuanaland nationhood. 
Constitutional Adua~zce 
In June 1964 Her Majesty's Government accepted in 
general the recommendations for constitutional change in 
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Bechuanaland put forward from the Territory (in Legis- 
lative Council Paper No. g of 196314: according to this 
document the recommendations were reached unani- 
mously). The first step will be a general election in March 
1965. The new Legislature will comprise an Upper and a 
Lower House. The latter will consist of approximately 
thirty-two members elected for a maximum of five years 
(the precise number of seats will depend on the delimitation 
of constituencies). There will also be four members chosen 
without regard to race by the elected members. The Prime 
Minister will nominate candidates for these seats but other 
legislators may add to the list of nominees. This provision 
may draw in specially qualified people who would not wish 
to stand in a constituency, or make it possible for special 
interests such as the business community or even a racial 
group such as the Asians to be represented. Since these 
seats can only be filled with the support of the elected 
members it is unlikely that contentious individuais will be 
elected to them. 
Election will be by universal adult suffrage; the franchise 
does not mention race and applies to both sexes equally. 
Provision is made for those working away from Bechuana- 
land, but for the actual registration and voting an elector 
must return to his polling station. Provision is also made 
for a Bill of Rights similar to those included in the con- 
stitutions of Kenya and Uganda. 
The Legislature will be elected by registered voters in 
single-member constituencies divided 011 an equal popula- 
tion basis, with consideration of community of interest, 
transport lines, tribal boundaries, and sparsity of population. 
To run for oflice, a candidate must be able to speak and 
read English well enough to participate in debates. 
The Upper House of Chiefs will be composed of the eight 
tribal heads in the B.P. and four additional members 
elected by thein. It  will have advisory powers, particularly 
in regard to rnattels of traditional authority. 
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Under the new arrangements the present Executive 
Council will be replaced by a Cabinet made up of Her 
Majesty's Commissioner, a Prime Minister, a Deputy 
Prime Minister, up to five other ministers drawn from the 
Legislative Assembly and the Financial Secretary. The 
latter will be ex o$icio Minister of Finance. The Attorney 
General will normally attend Cabinet meetings in an 
advisory capacity, and will later be replaced by a Minister 
from the Legislature. 
Her Majesty's Commissioner will retain control of 
external affairs and defence. He will also be responsible 
for the appointment and discipline of Public Service Officers 
on the advice of an independent Public Service Commis- 
sion and, in association with the Prime Minister, for internal 
security. He will have power to dissolve the Legislature if 
the Prime Minister so requests and if a vote of no-confidence 
has been passed, or if the post of Prime Minister becomes 
vacant and there is no prospect of a candidate gaining 
majority support. 
Thus Bechuanaland is about to take a long constitutional 
step forward. A clean break will be made not only with 
racialism and with members nominated by the represen- 
tatives of the British Government, but also with tribalism 
in the highest government of the country. 
No doubt, some thoughtful men are apprehensive over 
such a radical change at  one fell swoop. I t  would seem, 
however, that any less advanced system would not have 
set the African leadership a sufficiently challenging task 
nor have lasted long enough to become truly workable. 
The Bechuanaland arrangements go beyond the new 
Transkei constitution principally in the virtual elimination 
of traditional rule in the central Government. Furthermore, 
they imply a more rapid advance to full independence 
than has been suggested for the Transkei. The comparison 
is highly significant because of the offer made by Prime 
Minister Verwoerd to present his case to the Bechuana 
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people on the question of their possible association with 
South Africa. 
An objective observer cannot fail to note that materially 
greater improvements are being made in the Transkei than 
in Bechuanaland. If Britain could turn the Protectorates 
from the poor country cousins of southern Africa into 
something of a shop window for vigorous non-racial 
government, the changed situation would not be with- 
out an influence upon public thinking within the Republic 
itself. 
Experience gained in Ghana, Nigeria, Tanganyika, 
Uganda, and Kenya was evident in the whole approach to, 
and conduct of, the constitutional talks. Many earlier 
pitfalls have been avoided. That is not to say that sweet- 
ness and light will necessarily be the chief qualities of the 
life of the constitution when it comes into effect. But the 
problems will be new ones rather than those Britain learned 
from further north in Africa. The bargaining behind 
the scenes this time was never full of such suspicion, 
paternalism, and even bitterness as characterised earlier 
conferences of this nature in Africa. The pledges to African 
peoples which Britain has redeemed in the last decade 
have won her respect from those over whom the Union 
Jack still flies. 
No two colonial constitutions are the same but the 
Bechuanaland one coming into effect is unusual in that it 
transfers control from an official to an unofficial legislature 
while retaining a large share of the power in official hands. 
This is only possible because of the unanimous support for 
the constitutional changes by the existing members of 
Legco and also a general feeling of trust and confidence 
between the British Administration and the peoples of the 
territory. Without such a feeling the Legislature and Her 
Majesty's Commissioner would be a t  constant loggerheads 
and a series of constitutional crises would result. dthough 
not without calculated risks, the new constitution is a 
brilliant example of a particular adaptation to a particular 
time and situation. Furthermore, it is based upon the 
assumption that even these new changes are but an interim 
step towards full independence. 
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The B.P., in common with many developing countries, 
has a one-product economy. Not only are 87 per cent of 
exports based upon livestock, but improvements in national 
income have tended to increase the relative importance of 
cattle. 
Such dependence is highly risky. Drought is a recurring 
visitor to this low-rainfall country. Disease could sweep the 
herds as foot and mouth disease has in South West Africa. 
For Bechuanaland, control would be more dificult and the 
consequences more catastrophic. Competition in African 
markets and overseas is a constant threat to the national 
income from economic forces alone, not to mention political 
pressures. 
And yet developing countries do not often have the 
alternatives that might theoretically be attractive. In some 
new African countries, so much attention has been focused 
upon avoiding economic exploitation and in choosing who 
may invest that all investors have tended to stay away and 
make controls purely academic. In cold reality, Bechuana- 
land is compelled to play from its strength. The best 
middle term prospects for greater national income lie in 
quantitative gains in livestock production, further local 
processing to add value to the product, expansion of markets 
by volume, and the obtaining of higher prices. At present, 
some 98 per cent of the people within the country are 
dependent upon cattle for subsistence and cash income. I t  
may well be possible to reduce this concentration ofemploy- 
ment without reducing the national income from livestock. 
Cash savings in the B.P. are minimal and the transition 
from a barter economy based upon cattle is far from com- 
plete. If Britain has in the past kept Bechuanaland from 
being swallowed up, its contribution to education and its 
aid to capital formation have not been impressive. The 
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background assumption of eventual political transfer to 
South Africa had kept British development contributions 
unusually low even a decade after World War PI. Private 
investment has likewise been inhibited by political uncer- 
tainty, just as similar fears played a part in the slow develop- 
ment of such other African countries as Tanganyika and 
Togoland. 
Only indigenous African leadership can call for and 
demand the kinds of economic sacrifice which sometimes 
succeed in helping capital formation in poor countries. The 
imposition of greater economic stringency by a British 
Government would not have been politically feasible in 
the B.P., any more than Her Majesty's Government could 
introduce the compulsory cutting out of diseased cocoa trees 
in the best interests of the people of Ghana, a step an 
African Government could and did take. 
Viewed in the present-day world, Bechuanaland has a 
chance to profit from another side of the colonial relation- 
ship; namely, the generous treatment Great Britain has 
given to some newly independent African states now within 
the Commonwealth. The United Kingdom is the B.P.'s 
great and sure source of financial sympathy and capital 
support. 
African rule in Bechuanaland could mean greater local 
savings. Many of these might be less in cash than in con- 
tributions of voluntary labour released in the emotional 
dam-burst of independence. However, the popular and 
pressing and understandable cry for education and services 
may drown appeals for saving. Capital for investment is 
more likely to come from direct access to international 
agencies and foreign Governments on the one hand, and 
from private investors on the other, when the latter are 
convinced that the new African leadership can maintain 
stable government. 
A second unusual advantage of Bechuanaland is its 
physical proximity to South Africa, and especially to the 
booming Witwatersrand. Few undeveloped countries are 
as accessible to highly developed countries as Bechuanaland ; 
the relationship of Puerto Rico to the United States has 
points in parallel. A short distance away, inside the same 
financial system and customs wall, lie great monetary 
institutions, advanced educational facilities, and enormously 
complex and diversified skills. Bechuanaland does need its 
first dentist, but not a wide range of dental specialists. I t  
is hard to realise the savings in money, time, and general 
efficiency of having nearby specialists and research stations. 
And yet, as we will see, the political factors involved in 
the proximity of South Africa balance and may outweigh 
the economic advantages. 
Migrant Labour 
The fact that thousands of Bechuanas work in the 
Republic is itself very much a mixed blessing. At all times 
20 per cent of the adult male population are away working 
in South Africa, the motivation being primarily the lack 
of employment in Bechuanaland. A prestige factor has 
also developed since labour migration started about 1870, 
attaching to the man who has been to the 'big city', possibly 
undertaken dangerous mine work, and who returns home 
with presents and savings (translated into head of cattle) 
for his family. 
When remittances, savings, and goods are added up, 
migrant workers bring into the territory about AI  .3 million 
annually. 
On one hand, the territory loses the most productive 
years of the ablest members of the society, but on the other, 
some of the skills acquired in the city are transmitted to 
tribal life. However, most Bechuana work as mine labourers 
and acquire few skills, whereas the Basuto, for example, 
tend to secure the better jobs in and out of the mines. A 
significant by-product of migration is that the westernised 
sojourners tend to lose their respect for tribal authority. 
Now for those migrants outside the mines, this may be 
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replaced by some sophistication in western political organi- 
sation. This is rarely true of those in the mines where the 
non-Bechuana associates are likely to be migrant workers 
from another extra-South African territory. Thus, they 
may lose respect for traditional authority without gaining 
understanding or respect for a new authority beyond the 
routine of compound living and African 'boss boys'. 
The great student of Bechuana migration, Professor I. 
Schapera, has also stressed that migration leads to indis- 
cipline among women and children. Although the mine 
migrants were originally responsible for introducing tuber- 
culosis, syphilis, and other diseases into Bechuanaland, 
they are no Ionger alone in this regard. Schapera has found 
that migration leads to a later marriage age, and that this 
has encouraged promiscuity. He suggests that the birth 
rate is negatively affected in several ways by migration. 
One of the easiest armchair recommendations to stop 
migration evils is to suggest that migration be stopped. 
Political leaders in West Africa have also pointed out the 
political desirability of ceasing to send Rechuanas into 
'apartheid country'. This cannot be because of a belief 
that migratory labour, per se, is evil, even where it is acknow- 
ledged to be undesirable. Thousands of Africans from 
neighbouring French-speaking territories migrate season- 
ally to the cocoa belt of Ashanti for work on the land. 
Similarly, across the continent in Uganda, the migration 
for one or two years of Banyaruanda to work in the Baganda- 
owned cotton fields of Buganda, while down from an annual 
peak of ~oo,ooo plus, is still an immensely important labour 
migration. The difference for Bechuana migrants is that 
they go to work for 'white' masters, not black ones, even 
though they may receive higher pay and more material 
benefits. 
However, Schapera's reasons why, in 194.7, he would not 
recommend statutory attempts to restrict migrants, still have 
much of their force today. In the long run, it is the social 
and economic development of the B.P. which must provide 
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local employment and so fill the need which led poor and 
hungry migrants to the Witwatersrand in the first place. 
Progress is being made, for there are hundreds of Bechuanas 
gainfully at  work in the territory today who, a generation 
ago, would have found their only employment opportunity 
in South Africa. The B.P. Department of Education has 
searched in South Africa by advertisement and by personal 
contacts for expatriate Bechuana degree holders and others 
potentially able to assume educational posts in their own 
country. Unfortunately, as we have noted, Bechuanas 
have not acquired skills so frequently as other African 
expatriates in the Republic. 
Thus, the pragmatic case for slowing down and eventually 
ending migratory labour is economically convincing, and 
will be brought about through economic growth in the 
B.P. itself, all of which leads us to consider the broad 
educational picture. 
Education and Manpower 
Although maximum effort has been directed to education 
through decades of lean budgets, and generations of devoted 
officials and teachers, both African and European, have 
done their best, the educational standards of the B.P. are 
miserably low. Raising them is the prime development 
task. Where to concentrate limited educational resources 
is a difficult question, which will be considered after a 
brief review of the territory's educational development. 
Missionaries, and particularly the London Missionary 
Society, took the lead in establishing the early schools. 
One of the first was in the present Bakwena Reserve where 
David Livingstone had lived about 1845. A tribal pattern 
of schooling has persisted into the era of primarily govern- 
mental financing. Although the Tribal School Committees 
run the schools, the syllabuses, etc., are under the control 
of the Government Education Department. 
As the Government has pointed out, tribal management 
'ensures a very large degree of genuine local interest in 
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education and affords invaluable opportunities for training 
in committee work and in financial management'. What 
is recognised, but not often said, is that it also allows for 
financial mismanagement, a loss in planning efficiency 
when the tribes are taken individually, and not the B.P. 
collectively, and also the problem so characteristic of 
American education, that poor areas have poor schools 
and rich states or tribes pull farther ahead. Out of some 
2 I 8 primary schools, the Government directly administers 
25, the missions only 9, and all but one other are run by 
Tribal School Committees. The curricula in all the schools 
follow the pattern and general content of British education, 
with some adaptations (history, biology) to Africa and the 
B.P. 
About two-thirds of primary school pupils are girls. This 
reflects the use of young boys as cattle herders, and is in 
contrast with some agricultural parts of Africa where 
schools are flooded with boys, but the girls are kept back 
to help their mothers in the fields. Although there is still 
force in Aggrey's famous aphorism that to educate boys is 
to educate individuals, but to educate girls is to educate 
the family, and thus the nation, he applied it to environ- 
ments where male education was ahead. In view of the 
present role of women in Bechuana society, it is doubtful 
whether the economic return on girls9 education is now 
equal to that of boys. 
Whereas primary school pupils are of the order of go,ooo, 
secondary school totals have climbed steeply in recent years, 
but are still only just breaking the 1,000 level. About 60 
per cent of these advanced students are boys. Moeng 
College (secondary) in Bamangwato territory enrolled more 
girls than boys among its 250 pupils for the first term in 
1962. I t  is doubtful whether fifty primary students to one 
secondary student is a wise ratio. 
Probably the greatest financial wastage in Bechuanaland 
has occurred in education. When a boy leaves a cattle 
post for three or four years of schooling, he will not really 
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become usefully literate. No studies have been made of 
"ost literacy' in Bechuanaland, but the existence of the 
problem is not doubted. In many cases, he returns to the 
cattle and never reads a book again in his lifee, The lack 
of useful application of knowledge on the part of girls who 
drop out in primary years is as great. 
General education is good like motherhood, Santa Claus, 
and piety. But educational monies are as scarce in the B.P. 
as water. They must not be sprinkled indiscriminately 
across the educational desert where illiteracy may be 80 
per cent, but should be carefully husbanded to be used 
where maximum human returns are possible, to the end 
that education for all will come in as few decades as possible. 
The able Director of Education. Mr. Jack Hunter, and 
his staR, including Miss Chiepe, the leading African educa- 
tionalist, are aware of the present situation. The hard 
choice is between providing school for all or placing a 
greater emphasis on primary school completions and, above 
all, on the secondary school Ievel. I t  appears politically 
impossible to cut back on primary schools, and even cruel 
to deny struggling centres more schools. But it is likely 
that the greatest economic returns will come from emphasis- 
ing quality over quantity. Whether African leaders in 
power will be able to resist local demands is doubtful. 
Eastern Nigeria, for example, as a result of political pressure, 
probably spends too much money on primary schools to 
the detriment of creating jobs for those who finish them. 
I t  is a common phenomenon of developing countries, 
first noticed so sharply in India, that a surplus of partially 
educated people mushrooms. This is alreadynoticeableat the 
lower clerk Ievel in B.P. In the early 1950s in Ghana, there 
were positions for any young man who had completed some 
secondary schooling. But by 1960, I became increasingly 
conscious of the large numbers of unemployed and casu- 
ally employed school-leavers hanging around street corners. 
On the one hand, they felt themselves too educated for 
qriculture and disliked tribal authority, but on the other 
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hand, they were not well enough educated to find white- 
collar employment. As they grew in numbers, they con- 
stituted a potentially explosive political pressure group. I t  
was in part to meet this threat that Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
created the Builders Brigades modelled on the American 
depression-spawned G.C.C. (Civilian Conservation Corps). 
I t  is possible to return detribalised youths to the country- 
side for roadbuilding, dam making, and harvesting, if they 
are organised and inspired along modern city lines. 
Although Bechuanaland already does have unemployed 
clerk types, there were never greater opportunities for the 
able young Bechuana. The present school-going genera- 
tion has a limitless political, economic, and social future. 
Mobility of all kinds will never be higher in the history of 
the gestating nation. 
Bechuanaland resembles most developing African coun- 
tries in that the educational bottleneck is the secondary 
school. But it is different in laclring the university oppor- 
tunities so relatively abundant in Africa. Once through 
secondary school, it is easier for an African to get into a 
good university in Africa than for an American to get into 
a good institution in his country. The present unused 
capacity of most African universities will be filled as new 
secondary schools contribute their streams, but today able 
Bechuanas could find admittance in many parts of the 
continent. 
I t  may be said in jest, but also with truth, that what the 
steel mill is as a symbol to developing Asian countries, the 
university is to developing African countries. African 
leaders and British officials in the B.P. all agree today that 
a university is beyond the foreseeable financial capability 
of the territory. The number of Bechuanas currently 
studying at  universities is only twenty. Sharp percentage 
increases are likely, but an output of hundreds of advanced 
students is at  least a decade ahead. Meanwhile, the 
question is, where will Bechuanas go who do carry on their 
education? In the past, thc majority of thcrn have obtained 
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various forms of higher education in South Africa. The 
Tiger Kloof Mission institution in the Republic educated 
a substantial number of Bechuana leaders. At a higher 
academic level, Fort Hare played a role before it became 
an ethnic institution for Xhosa speakers. But for a variety 
of reasons, South Africa is unlilrely to be the site of much 
Bechuana degree work. 
Official arrangements currently provide for Bechuanas to 
attend the secular University College in Basutoland, which 
grew out of the Pius XIII College near Maseru. There is a 
favourable linguistic background in that both territories 
are Sotho-speaking, but in any event, the instruction would 
be in English. I t  is likely that as new institutions develop 
nearer by, such as the Zambia University, Bechuana 
students will never be thus concentrated in Basutoland. 
In this part of Africa, the political flux makes long-range 
assumptions for higher education uncertain. This is not 
serious for Bechuanaland, where small numbers make it 
unnecessary to blueprint precisely where and how higher 
education will be organised. 
The economic development of the B.P. is intertwined 
with its political growth; the stability of the latter is a 
prerequisite for success in the former. What is needed on 
both fi-onts is a substantial flow of men and women who 
have completed a good post-primary education. In Africa 
today, as in Britain or the U.S. a generation ago, a man 
needs a secondary education as a launching pad from which 
his own abilities will have a chance to take over. 
In comparative educational terms, Bechuanaland is un- 
like Ghana, where the writer estimated in 1950 that there 
were about 1,200 living graduates. I t  is like the Congo, 
where the number of graduates, not including African 
priests, was of the order of sixteen at the time of independ- 
ance. The Congo is a tremendous territory, and the anarchy 
following independence was disastrous in the lives of 
average Col~golese. I was an observer in the Congo in 
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1960 during the worst of the fighting and raping. But 
those who would hold up the Gongo as an example of 
African inability to rule, or would emphasise the limited 
number of graduates, must also take note of the recently 
demonstrated abilities of some hundreds of Congolese 
leaders whose formal education ended with secondary 
school. Bechuanaland's population is not much larger than 
that of greater Leopoldville; it lacks the tribal antipathies; 
and its economic problems are of a far lower order than 
those of the Congo. Given the sound foundation of a sub- 
stantial outflow of good secondary-school-educated men, 
Bechuanaland will be a well-run African country. I t  is 
the priceless advantage permeating the whole educational 
life of the B.P. to be moving towards independence without 
the political bitterness of the Congo, with far more trust 
between white and black, and a present Administration 
whose success will be measured by how successful a self- 
governing Bechuanaland will be, and not how long this 
stage is delayed. 
Since I January 1964, all State-aided schools in Bechu- 
analand have been open to qualified students regardless of 
race. That is to say that European children are free to 
enter Sechuana-medium schools if they have sufficient 
command of the tongue, and Bechuana children with 
adequate English cannot be refused admission to English- 
medium schools. The linguistic distinction could be, but 
is not, a device for racial segregation. 
A particularly thorny problem closely related to educa- 
tion is the recruitment of skilled manpower. TO be sure, 
Bechuanaland has a capable civil service of Europeans and 
Africans, and Africanisation if gradual should be possible 
without loss of efficiency. But again, politics are important, 
specifically in the attitude of the African leaders and the 
British Government to the employment of South Africans. 
Approximately half the civil servants, and many of those 
acknowledged the most =gable, are Sou& Afiicm-born. 
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But many have devoted their careers to work in the Protec- 
torate and identify themselves closely with its people and 
its problems. 
However, the British Government, acting on advice 
from a visiting expert, and not necessarily with the con- 
currence of local British-born officials, has seen fit to dis- 
criminate against Bechuanaland civil servants on the 
grounds of their place of original employment, and to all 
intents and purposes on nationality rather than on merit. 
I t  has been said that an extraordinarily able Director of 
Agriculture was lost to the territory as a result of such a 
discriminatory approach. A completely convincing case 
could be made against anyone born in South Africa, or 
anywhere else, whose attitude and actions towards Africans 
smacked of racial prejudice. But the official referred to 
was so highly regarded as a person, Afrikaner or not, that 
groups of Bechuana farmers went out of their way to 
honour him with parties on his departure. Good grounds 
can be found for suddenly clearing the security police of 
South Africans by transferring them to less sensitive work, 
although some of them were not happy that twenty years 
of unblemished service counted for nothing against the new 
criterion of which country they came from. But there is a 
feeling in the Bechuanaland civil service that there are 
now two classes of civil servants, and what counts most 
for retirement and, to a lesser extent, for promotion, in 
the eyes of London, is birthplace and not ability. This is 
not to say that no South Africans are promoted. 
Her Majesty's Cornmissioner has stressed to the writer 
that the overseas aid scheme is intended to provide special 
inducements to members of Her PvPBjesty7s Overseas Civil 
Service and certain other officers recruited by the Secretary 
of State, mainly in administrative or professional posts, 
for which there is a shortage of applicants. Most of these 
officers are from the United Kingdom, but some of the 
senior South Mrican oBcers are also designated under the 
&erne. No %u& isfrimns ]have been required to rebe.  
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The Bechuanaland Government is taking the future employ- 
ment of South Africans under consideration, because it is 
felt officially that the employment of aliens is not normal. 
In addition to the process of Africanisation, the B.P. 
Government is taking special care with new 'European' 
appointments. Officers of any race who are recruited in 
southern Africa do not share in the expatriate and induce- 
ment elements of the overseas officers. 
All of this is the source of a good deal of heartburning 
in the service and it remains in most African countries a 
ticklish problem to which independence has brought no 
easy solution. For the first years after Ghanaian independ- 
ence, the Professor of Agriculture at  the University College 
and a majority of his staff were wlzite South African 
citizens. In Bechuanaland, it would not be easy to replace 
the many able men in non-political positions such as 
livestock inspectors. One might expect that the test should 
be whether they will serve well and with respect under an 
Africanised Government, and not whether under the British 
lead they will be forced out of their positions. The transi- 
tion in Ghana and in Nigeria and Uganda was smoothly 
and efficiently handled for the most part. But white South 
Africans are treated equally with white people generally. 
The present discrimination in many independent A.fiiican 
countries such as Tanganyika against even the most liberal 
white journalist or minister of religion from the Republic 
is however an indication of possible future trouble. Bechu- 
analand is not the first country in which the special South 
African issue has arisen. Virtually alI the British-employed 
South Africans in Basutoland have been discharged or 
transferred elsewhere in response to Basuto pressures. 
When and if a similar pattern unfolds in Bechuanaland, 
some large-scale manpower adjustmentswill have to bemade. 
Despite whatever arrangements may be made to retain 
efKcient and loyal South African-burr? civil servants, as 
well as those provided from the United Kingdom, one can 
expect a higher than i~ i~rmal  r te ol'attrition as independence 
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approaches. What are the prospects for replacement 
beyond the education of Bechuanas we have described? 
~ & p t  is about the only country to the north with a surplus 
of educated personnel. Black Africa needs the people it 
now has and will not have an 'export' of men for some 
years. Probably the best source of skilled Africans is the 
Republic of South Africa, where the educational system- 
in purely academic terms-was long in advance of any 
country south of the Sahara. Educated Africans, among 
them 49,000 with professional qualifications, are not 
utilised to their maximum effectiveness, nor paid so well as 
whites with the same degrees, and many may willingly 
work in a neighbouring country to escape onerous restric- 
tions in their personal lives. Indeed, the danger that 
Sesuto-speaking Africans from the Republic may 'move in' 
on Bechuanaland posts is not without its dangers of friction. 
In Maun, the capital of Ngamiland, one hears whispers 
against the ruling Regent because she is a South African- 
born girl from the Orange Free State, although she has 
been in Maun for twenty years and other Bechuana chiefs 
have married South African girls. 
u 
Tribal and national prejudice are likewise barriers to 
imports from other parts of Africa. Ghana did not have 
an- altogether succe~sful experience with imported West 
Indians in such fields as the judiciary. Americans of Pfrican 
descent have many psychological problems stemming from 
their resentment if they are not accepted as Africans and 
the contrary resentment if they are accepted. The level of 
salaries Bechuanaland can pay is a limiting factor. I t  is likely 
that individuals-not excluding all Europeans-from 
throughout Africa and elsewhere will find acceptance and 
make a contribution on an individual basis. But no outside 
group would seem to be 'the answer9 to Bechuanaland9s 
short-term and middle-term skilled manpower problems. 
Some help may come from the many capable Bechuana 
who live in the western Transvaal and, although often 
limited in formal education, hold what are practically 
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speaking skilled positions in the industrial complex of the 
Republic. 
Cattle Indust?-y 
Cattle are the lifeblood of the B.P., the principal form of 
savings, basis of the major export industry, and the greatest 
asset for immediate increases in national income. Although 
cattle are also the esteemed form of wealth and have great 
cultural significance, the Bechuana will and do sell their 
beasts. The 'Masai problem9 of large herds without 
practical economic value, over-grazing, erosion, and more 
over-grazing, is not so thorny as it has been in East Africa. 
The Bechuana cattle sales handle a reasonable annual 
offtake of 6 per cent. In 1963, exports were 130,000- 
about 10 per cent. This could be raised, experts feel, to 
even 15 per cent. 
Africans own about 90 per cent of the cattle, and the 
tendency among most owners, with notable exceptions 
among African owners of larger herds and Europeans, is 
to place quantity above quality. Cattle are owned by the 
head of the family in trust. The Bechuana are careful about 
slaughtering cattle for their own consumption, and a 
change in eating patterns does not now threaten to reduce 
the numbers available for export. Cattle are at present 
essential for ploughing, hauling wagons, and as a source of 
dairy products. 
African-owned cattle are normally herded in the bare, 
udenced veld. Herds are kept at 'cattle posts' under the 
care of employees, and often great distances from the main 
towns where the Bechuana owners may live. The posts are 
sited with reference to available grass, the flat pans of water 
which persist long after rains, and the water points drilled 
by the Government, tribal authorities, or private syndicates. 
Some good grazing land is not utilised because of drought. 
The territory's average carrying capacity is low at one beast 
per fifty acres. 
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The Barnanpato, Barolong, and Bakgatla tribes main- 
tain their own livestock improvement centres. The direc- 
tions of improvement which involve no technical problem, 
but rather wider education and social acceptance, include 
introduction of better bulls on a systematic basis and not 
the occasional effort now made; selling cattle at  a younger 
age and not using up valuable grazing on aged beasts; 
culling out the unfit animals and castrating the inferior bulls. 
Strenuous efforts have been made to protect grazing, es- 
pecially in the vicinity of watering points where grass is 
under the heaviest pressure. Greater control is necessary in 
the interests of all cattle owners. The Bakgatla, under a 
strong chief, have set an excellent pattern in controlling 
grazing with a general limit of 500 head near a borehole; 
many of their boreholes are developed by syndicates of 
cattle owners. 
I t  is unlikely that a Government of Africans would be 
able to issue stronger orders than some chiefs do now. 
However, in the B.P. as a whole, an African Government 
could enforce stricter regulations with stiffer penalties and 
probably be more persuasive as well in enlisting the co- 
operation of cattle owners. On the other hand, the political 
pressures on vulnerable African politicians might well be 
so great that worse misuse of natural resources could result. 
The sharp increase in poaching and lack of effective control 
in some newly-independent African states shows this other 
side of the coin, 
An African Government will undoubtedly wish to reduce 
its dependence upon South Africa for a wide range of 
veterinary assistance. South African research and provision 
of vaccines have been a major factor in improving B.P. 
cattle. I t  will cost money to replace what South Africa has 
willingly supplied in kind through the years. This is not to 
mention that the great majority of veterinarians and cattle 
inspectors in the B.P. have been recruited in the Republic 
with greater experience and lower costs than would be 
involved in bringing such men from elsewhere. A negative 
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side of this may have been to postpone the training of 
Bechuana technicians and inspectors for the cattle industry. 
But the abrupt termination of scientific and personnel 
relationships with South Africa would seriously cripple 
the expansion of the cattle industry. 
The great strides in the industry have been made in 
marketing. Just a decade ago, all cattle were marketed on 
the hoof. Today, the Lobatsi Abattoir, started by the 
Colonial Development Corporation, processes up to go per 
cent of the cattle exported. The value of such cattle has been 
running at an annual rate of L2.1 million. The C.D.C. 
venture is an outstanding example of successful develop- 
ment, not only in its economic achievements, but in 
winning the acceptance of the indigenous population. The 
total C.D.C. investment in Bechuanaland is ~1,859,000, 
compared with &1g,488,ooo in Swaziland and ~200,ooo 
in Basutoland. 
In an effort to give the abattoir more 'grass roots9 in the 
B.P., the Government has already secured shares in the 
enterprise, as have a group of trustees acting on behalf of 
the producers. Profits in excess of 6 per cent are devoted to 
various schemes to assist cattle production in the territory. 
I t  is not unlikely that in the long run the ownership of the 
abattoir will be in the hands of Bechuanas and thus conclude 
a bright chapter in the colonial development book. This 
is not to ignore many current and potential problems. 
Demands for a second abattoir in Francistown have been 
persistent and not without long-range sense. However, the 
premature launching of a second venture could financially 
jeopardise both abattoirs. 
Markets in Africa are subject to the usual price vicissitudes 
and to political changes. In the long run, the Congo and 
Angola markets are full of promise. Ngamiland at  present 
sells much of its cattle to the Rhodesias because of great 
distance from thc railroad and from Lobatsi. Lacking a 
seaport, the B.P. is dependent upon its neighbours for 
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access to world markets. The present route for chilled 
carcasses through lwafeking, south to Cape Town, and 
eventually onto the British table, is obviously dependent 
upon a stable and unhostile South Africa. A boycott of 
South African ports by Becfiuanaland meat exports would 
have even less impact than similar action by Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland against Angolan and Mozambique 
ports, respectively. At present, these African countries 
would be cutting their throats in order to inflict minor 
wounds on a potential adversary. Bechuanaland could 
refuse to sell meat in the South African market to the 
delight of South and South West African producers. The 
cold facts are that the strategic geography of southern 
Africa strongly favours South Africa and the Portuguese 
territories. 
The long-range prospects for B.P. cattle are excellent. No 
major breakthrough in technology is required. The great 
potential boon is discovery and use of additional water 
resources. But even without such good fortune or Okavango 
development, the steady (if limited) investment of capital, 
and the continued education efforts of Government depart- 
ments, promise an even greater contribution to the gross 
national producc. It  is politically significant that this 
resource, so vital to the E.P., is intimately bound up in the 
life of its people. Although technical change may be slowed 
up by the need to ~ducate  illiterate people and to change 
established customs, Bechuanaland does not resemble some 
Middle Eastern oil countries in which the most advanced 
technology imported by aliens never becomes an integral 
part of the lives of the people, failing to benefit them in non- 
material ways, with the result that such a dichotomy occurs 
in the national life that political stability is threatened. 
Even if attractive alternatives are presented to the develop- 
ment of tlae cattle industry, political common sense would 
dictate that the role of the cattle industry at least keep pace 
with mineral or industrial development. 
Agriculture 
Crops are the poor cousin of cattle in both financial 
importance and status. And yet the B.P. faces an immediate 
need for greater agricultural production if profits from 
selling meat are not to be consumed in impor~ng food for 
a growing population. 
The 1960 economic survey mission estimated the total 
arable land of the B.P. at  8 rnillion acres, of which about 
5 per cent was under cul~vation. African dryland farms 
are estimated to produce crops valued at some ~~ ,ooo ,ooo ,  
primarily for local consumption. Expansion is possible for 
sorghum, millet, and groundnuts. Maize or American corn 
is a dubious crop under low and unreliable rainfall. 
Poor agricultural practices characterise the territory. 
Animal manure is not applied to the fields, seeding is 
haphazard, and field cleanliness ignored. Maize is the 
principal crop, followed by sorghum (kaffir corn), which is 
more resistant to drought. Threshing is done by beating 
with long sticks. The handful of European farmers show 
maize yields from ten to fifteen times those of African 
farmers, an indication of what better techniques would 
mean to the bulk of the Bechuana farmers. 
The practice of farmers living in villages far from the 
communal fields and not fencing them, when added to the 
primitive methods of ploughing, explains in part why 
only 5 per cent of the potential arable land (given present 
water supplies) is under cultivation. A final indication of 
the low level of agriculture is the need to import maize 
from South Africa and, indirectly, to export labour to 
South Africa. 
The Bechuana have always lived in big towns by African 
standards. The town is divided into wards in which closely 
related people live together. Each ward has its own kgotla 
or meeting place. The traditional houses are strongly and 
neatly built, and these are not temporary settlemen& such 
as are found in most of the traditional Mrica. This social 
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organisation has meant close and eff~cient administration, 
and make5 it possible to provide amenities for many peoplc. 
On the other hand, we have mentioned the disadvantages 
of fields arid cattle posts far from the towns. An adult 
Bechuana may do a considerable amount of travelling. 
Characteristically for undeveloped countries, the most 
difficult and precarious farming-that most in need of 
technical knowledge and capital-is undertaken by those 
farmers who are least educated and most short of capital. 
Imp~ovcrncnts in dryland Afiican farming will be an uphill 
struggle under the best of circumstances, with Government 
relief efforts after droughts becoming a standard practice. 
Progressive African farmers complain that communal 
ownership of land discourages improvements, and that they 
cannot fence to improve their livestock. Fragmentation of 
land into smaller pieces and its location far from villages 
are further impediments to agricultural eficiency in the 
B.P., just as they are in other parts of thc world, such as 
Bavaria. The custom persists in some parts that no African 
can plough his land until his own chief has given the signal 
and is another irritant to the farmer who may not have the 
same crops as most of his neighbours, or simply has other 
ideas on when to plant and when to harvest. This custom 
no doubt had validity in older tribal days when the chief 
and his advisers had a monopoly on accumulated knowledge 
of the seasons. Although anachronistic, it persists as a 
deterrent to better individual farming. 
The most promising area for Government action is in 
the provision of improved storage facilities and in enhancing 
marketing facilities. Roads have made a noticeable differ- 
ence in agricultural marketing in most of the Protectorate, 
and famine is no longer a threat in a small community. 
The most promising means towards immediate and 
substantial production of cash crops, already pioneered by 
European farmers along the eastern strip, lies in irrigation. 
There are suitably fertile soils to repay the addition of ferti- 
lisers; and water and unexploited sources of water exist. 
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High yields are obtainable under the excellent conditions of 
summer. Winter frost, in part the resuIt of rapid radiation 
on cloudless nights, limits ihe scope of tropical crops. One of 
the best recommended new crops is cotton, but it would 
require new marketing arrangements. The established 
groundnuts, maize and wheat (of which there is a shortage 
in South Africa) have already proved successful. 
, A 
Again, politics intrude upon the economic scene. I t  is not 
politically feasible for the Government to spend large sums 
to  help European farmers produce greater export crops, 
although it may be expected that African leaders will be 
careful not to lose what has been achieved. Expansion of 
irrigated farming will have a firm political footing if 
advanced Mica; farmers are encouraied and assisted to 
u 
play a substantial role. There are no racial restrictions upon 
African ownership of farms throughout the B.P., and a 
handful of Africans do farm in what are predominantly 
European farming areas. The Bamalete and Bangwaketse 
Reserves both have irrigation projects. New financial 
institutions to assist able Africans to farm on a larger than 
traditional scale may be required. All of this presumes that 
traditional tribal practices are incompatible with the high 
returns required from irrigated agriculture. Arrangements 
for some tribal units to enter such farming on a co-operative 
basis would be politically wise if administratively difficult. 
Another avenue for improved income lies in expanding 
the dairy industry. The European farmers in the remote 
Ghanzi district have built up a fair-sized business by the sale 
of cream through South West Africa, and both Africans and 
Europeans produce for the Francistown creamery. Dairy 
income is running at a level of £145,000 annually. ~ h k  
industry is heavily dependent upon markets in neighbouring 
countries. A responsible Bechuana politician was approached 
with a reauest for him to advocate Bechuanaland's refusal 
to sell cream to certain countries as a political gesture. In 
reply, he said he would support such a move if those 
countries urging the step would buy Bechuanaland's cream 
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for at least 75 per cent of the price now received. The offer 
was not accepted. 
It  is true of agriculture, as it is of almost every aspect of 
the economic life of the territory, that present scientific 
lrnowledge barely scratches the surface of its soil. Only the 
most general and isolated efforts have been made to study 
the soils of the whole territory, to experiment with possible 
crops, and to discover how present crop yields could be 
enhanced. A handful of devoted men have been struggling 
with problems that require more men and financing than 
has been available. For example, little work has been done 
on the commercial exploitation of timber in the few northern 
parts of the territory where rainfall is adequate. 
Minerals 
Bechuanaland is surrounded by some of the richest mining 
areas on the face of the globe. Not only does South Africa 
dominate world gold production, but it has a treasurehouse 
of other ores. South West Africa leads the world in produc- 
ing gem diamonds and has a variety of metallic assets. 
Northern Rhodesia shares ownership of the copperbelt, 
with a quarter of the world's supply of copper. Southern 
Rhodesia has a profitable assortment of mines. Angola, a 
neighbour beyond the Caprivi Strip, has diamonds and 
oil. 
The B.P. has very few mining areas. Asbestos and man- 
ganese are being mined on a modest scale in Bangwaketse 
land. B.P. manganese production in 1960 was 22,350 long 
tons. A new mine operates in Bamalete territory, in the 
south-eastern corner of the B.P. Here a Transvaal company 
aims at  a monthly production of 5,000 tons. Minor gold 
and silver production in the Tati Concession has petered 
out. After three years of investigation, the Rhodesia 
Selection Trust (R.S.T.) is expected to decide shortly on 
plans to produce soda ash and sodium sulphate from the 
Makarikari Flats. Copper, lead and nickel are under in- 
vestigation in Bamangwato tribal territory. Since 1959, 
!j8 BECHUANALAND 
R.S.T. has had rights to 40,000 square miles and, in 1963, 
announced the finding of a copper mineralisation 60 miles 
west of Francistown. Low-grade coal fields have been 
proved on a large scale nearthe railroad north of Palapye 
and at  Mamabula. Prospects for their commercial exploit- 
ation are at  present not bright. Thus there is no bonanza 
on the scale of B.P.'s neighbours. 
I s  this a true reflection of the distribution of mineral 
resources? Simple logic would suggest that the lack of 
mineral discoveries in Bechuanaland is due in part to a 
lack of chance discoverv in its vast and almost uninhabited 
parts. But to recall our geological description; in much of 
the territory the granite rocks are overlain by Kalahari 
sands and also by thin Karoo sedimentary rocks, so that 
discovery of underlying ores is not easy. The overburden 
would not be a major barrier to exploiting valuable dis- 
coveries. Successive refinements in methods of aerial pro- 
pecting offer real hope for making significant finds at 
economic costs. Results of a recent aerial survey which 
used advanced equipment for detecting the presence of 
magnetic ore bodies have not been publicly released. 
Unpublished work by South African geologists in South 
West Africa suggests that a payable copper strike north and 
east of Windhoek may extend into, if not through, Bechuana- 
land, and even link up with the Northern Rhodesian copper- 
belt. There are other mineral-bearing formations in the 
Republic which dip under the surface in Bechuanaland. 
Geological research is one more B.P. Government depart- 
ment where limited funds and a small staff have been in- 
adquate to the immense task of achieving a detailed 
knowledge of the country and its resources. Given African 
control, it may be possible to induce outside investment 
groups to risk large sums on searching for payable minerals. 
Her Majesty's Government has been extraordinarily 
careful in the B.P., as it has usually been elsewhere, not to 
alienate local resources. Enough political repercussions have 
occurred in Africa to reveal how dangerous alienation can 
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be. However, while new Governments are rightly cautious 
and sometimes over-suspicious of foreign investment, they 
can often afford greater political risks than the colonial 
power would take. A foreign investor can a t  least know 
that he will not be swept away in the anti-colonial tide. 
To  put a frank finger directly upon Bechuanaland's 
position, the most likely sources of enthusiasm, capital, and 
technical expertise are South Africa, and, secondly, Southern 
Rhodesia. But concessions in these quarters have long carried 
a particularly high political risk for Great Britain, and new 
ones to South African concerns now seem unlikely. It is 
quite in order for Ghana to buy gold mining machinery 
from South Africa; permissible for Ghana, Tanganyika, 
and the Soviet Union to market their diamonds through 
De Beers, and for various other independent African and 
Asian States to trade directly or sub rosa with South Africa. 
But a great storm would arise all the way from Legislative 
Council in Lobatsi to the General Assembly in New York 
if the U.K. were to sign a major concession arrangement 
with South African interests. An African Government, 
acting strictly according to what it felt were the best interests 
of the people of the territory, would be far freer to make 
concessions or to accept investment from groups injohannes- 
burg or Moscow. From the viewpoint of an African Govern- 
ment, great merit lies in the encouragement of investment 
&om a variety of nations, including those not directly in the 
Cold War, as both Emperor Haile Selassie and President 
Tubman of Liberia have done so shrewdly. 
At present, the mineral rights of the B.P. are widely and 
anachronistically dispersed. I n  tribal areas (including what 
is known as the Barolong farms), the tribe has the power to 
make or refuse concessions. Individuals who have sat 
through endless kgotlas (New England-type town meetings), 
trying to explain various provisions of agreements, are not 
enamoured of the system. The great danger for the B.P. as a 
whole is that a major discovery in one tribal area would 
lead to large revenues and presumably better roads and 
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schools, and a healthy standard of living for one tribe, while 
a poor tribe would continue to suffer-ii-om financial mal- 
nutrition. 
The British South Africa Company (B.S.A. Co.) has the 
mineral rights in the Lobatsi, Gaberones, and Tuli blocks, 
as does the Tati Company in its concession. The B.S.A. 
Company had similar rights in Northern Rhodesia, and 
did not gain a reputation there for being a progressive 
company with a deep interest in the welfare and the wishes 
of the African inhabitants. In Northern Rhodesia, public 
criticism of the B.S.A. Company was contrasted with 
occasional praise for the activities of the Anglo American 
and ~hode i i an  Selection Trust mining companies. As we 
have seen, the Tati Company has had a poor image in 
Bechuanaland. The political temperature in Bechuanaland 
is such that antaponism betwein the concession holders 
" 
and the people of'the territory is more likely to increase than 
decrease. Investors may therefore hesitate to conclude 
agreements with the holders of mineral rights. One may 
anticipate a revision or even a buying back of some of the 
present mineral rights held by outside interests. 
The remainder of mineral rights cover Crown land and 
are held by the British Government on behalf of the 
Bechuana people. The only public prospecting allowed has 
been in a small area opened to diamond prospectors since 
1941. An overhaul and rationalisation of the system of 
mineral concessions, so that greater control for the whole 
B.P. lies in the hands of the central Government, appears 
desirable to encourage mineral investigation, and to see 
that any royalties are distributed in such a way as to maxi- 
mise economic development. 
Tourism 
Probably no area of the B.P. economy could be more 
immediately responsive to results than tourism. The Govern- 
ment is aware of this and is trying to encourage it. Its 
potential has hardly been tapped. Bechuanaland has never 
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been a mecca for tourists. It  lacks an international airport 
which so often prompts the flying tourist to stop off for a 
few days and it has no good tourist hotel. At present, to see 
anything of the B.P.'s attractions takes several weeks and 
expensive preparation. The former hampers the inter- 
national tourist business and the latter the local resort 
business. 
Game is the chief attraction to the tourist and Bechuana- 
land has an appeal to the international hunter on a variety 
of grounds. I t  is new hunting country, despite the fact that 
almost a century ago hunters, and later the most famous 
hunter in Africa, Selous, shot elephant and other game 
by the hundred and thousand. Elephant is not up to the 
East African standard, but sable and trophies of other 
exotic buck may be larger and many herds far more 
numerous. 
The costs of developing hunting areas are high. To 
encourage a substantial investment requires protection of 
the investors. This means that large areas must be leased 
and free hunting trips through the territory by distinguished 
guests must not be allowed. The long-range yield from wild 
game also requires a close control of safari teams to ensure 
the best conservation practices and to avoid 'shooting out' 
an area. In this connection it may also be noted that game 
cropping could provide a valuable source of protein. 
Game, like minerals, is subject to local tribal control, 
as well as overall Government regulation. It  is not easy for 
a tribal kgotla, where the voices of illiterate old men have 
the greatest influence, always to reach the most sophisticated, 
legally and administratively sound agreements with safari 
companies. It  has been said that the Oliavango is the 
'richest game land left in Africa'. Indiscriminate shooting 
by white tourists or by white, and more often Airican, 
poachers, already threatens the decimation of this valuable 
resource. In the best interests of the Batawana, the tribe 
most affected by hunting for game, the decisions on the 
development of the Okavango will have to be made at  a 
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higher administrative level than the tribal council. Suspicion 
of 'white' decisions from the local District Commissioner 
up to top Government may be finally eliminated only under 
African rule. But African rule is no guarantee that poaching 
will be effectively stopped and that wise arrangements will 
be entered into with outside safari companies. Meanwhile, 
it appears possible that new regulations can encourage 
investment, protect the reyourccs, and increase the yield 
for the B.P. by requirinq the local purchasing of supplies 
and employment of local inhabitants. 
The secoild major tourist attraction, evcn less developed 
than game, is the strange and cxotic life of the Bushmen 
described in Chapter I. The Stone Agc life pattern of these 
'harmless people' has a powel-ful fascination for many who 
come to know them. But tf~ere are strong local feelings, 
especially on the part of white oficials who work closely 
with the Bushmen or are associated with anthropological 
study of them, that they should be 'left alone9. Some 
individuals are fiercely protective of 'my Bushmen'. Whether 
isolation is possible or practical is a moot point. Nevertheless 
it may not be impossible for wise and humane administra- 
tion to allow visitors some insight into the strange, incredibly 
clever and fascinating life of the Bushman tribes without 
exploitation. 
In  the coming years, more expeditions and people will 
seek to study the Kalahari Bushmen for scientific reasons, 
or simply out of curiosity. Regulations to prohibit (if 
possible), discourage, encourage, or somehorv capitalise on 
this interest far the benefit of the Bushmen and/or Bcchuana- 
land will not be easy to frame, and are sure to engender 
fierce controversy. The 'kcep them as they are' school will 
have as many critics among Africans generally as among 
people outside the continent, just as will a policy of western- 
ising, or otherwise markcdly changing their nomadic battle 
against the elements. One suspects that they will be settled, 
educated, and gradually disappear in a cultural sense from 
the face of the earth. 
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Wild animals and Bushmen do not exhaust, even though 
they dominate, Bechuanaland's tourist potential. One 
additional attraction one hesitates to mention is the famous 
'lost city' of the Kalahari. But, like so many legends, it has 
gained a stature that no amount of debunking will destroy. 
One of the better 'debunking' discoveries was made by a 
group of Northern Rhodesian Boy Scouts. They brought 
back pictures of a particular geological formation which 
might pass for regularly shaped building blocks with mortar 
between them. But the legend persists. One can predict 
with some certainty that tourist folders will not refrain from 
mentioning the 'lost city', and no doubt associating it with 
a fabled past. 
Serious tourism, whether it involves Bushmen, or shooting 
game with camera and gun, is just beginning in the B.P. I t  
could provide not only welcome taxes for needed Govern- 
ment projects, but also employment for both unskilled and 
skilled Bechuanas. One would like to see the day when 
Bechuana-owned and managed hotels and safari companies 
were world famous and a major source of national revenue. 
That time is obviously distant, but the time to begin is at 
hand. The same might be said of the Okavango, perhaps 
Bechuanaland's greatest untapped natural resource. 
Okauango 
The twin natural problems of Bechuanaland are too little 
water and too much. The Okavango River rises in Angola, 
crosses the B.P. border in the extreme north-west, and 
discharges a large volume of water into the Qkavango 
swamps, where it is lost through direct evaporation and 
evapo-transpiration of the abundant vegetation in the 
channels. The perenially flowing Ghobe River, forming the 
northern border of the Protectorate and emptying into the 
Zambezi, has irrigation possibilities of its own. 
In some years, the Okavango floods reach as far south as 
Lake Ngami; in others, the flood water fails to break 
through. In August 1963 I made an aerial reconnaissance 
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of the lake which was then at  one of the highest points in 
forty years and had spread out over the dry plains. Huge 
flights of delicately coloured pink flamingos wheeled and 
turned as our little plane flew low, and numerous cattle and 
wild animals were repeatedly threatened with isolation 
on low islands created by the flood waters. A century ago, 
David Livingstone was one of the first white men to see Lake 
Ngami. Although he did not go round it, he described it 
from hearsay as a huge inland sea with a circumference of 
170 miles. The famous German geographer, Siegfried 
Passarge, in his 1904 study of the Kalahari, estimated the 
size of the lake at one time as 300 miles by IOO miles, or 
about the size of Lake ~ i c h i & n  or Lalre Superior, and 
larger than the Irish Sea. 
The Okavango delta itself has been estimated by W. G. 
Brind, former Director of Public Works for Bechuanaland, 
as embracing over 6,500 square miles, or an area almost the 
size of Wales. After a study in 194.5, L. A. McKenzie, 
Director of Irrigation in South Africa, estimated that about 
- 
3,000 square miles were under water in a normal flood year. 
According to McKenzie, the annual rate of evaporation is 
72 inches per year in the delta. Estimates of the amount of 
water flowing into the delta range from six to eleven million 
acre feet per year (an acre foot is an acre covered to a depth 
of one foot). By any standards, this is a tremendous volume 
of fresh water to be of almost no value to people living in a 
desert country. The obvious thought is: can one move some 
of the water from the swamps to the arid plains and thus 
make both areas more productive? To some it is a wild 
dream, to others a dream which will some day come true. 
Most of the many water schemes in this part of Bechuana- 
land and in neighbouring territories are related to the 
flatness of the terrain. This means that exchange between 
river systems takes place, and that such stretches as the 
outlet of Lake Ngami sometimes flow one way and then 
turn round with a fairly stiff current in the opposite direc- 
tion. Under conditions when water is spreading out over 
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enormous areas, its movement usually becomes sluggish 
and thick tropical vegetation grows rapidly, impeding 
its flow through channels. When these clog up, the moving 
water finds another outlet until it, in turn, is congested with 
growing and dying vegetation. All of this vegetation con- 
tributes to tremendous evaporation. 
Popular interest in the Okavango delta was stimulated by 
a famous book, The Kalahari or Thirstland Redemption, by 
E. H. L. Schwarz, published in 1920. Schwarz, Professor of 
Geology at  Rhodes University, had been a student of the 
progressive dessication of Africa, and conceived a scheme 
whereby the swamp water was to be spread out even further 
through a series of lakes, and the resulting evaporation 
would materially improve the rainfall of much of southern 
Africa as far south as the Union. Subsequent studies 
contradicted some of Schwarz's assumptions concerning 
gradients, and a report in 1925 by South Africa's famous 
scientist, A. L. du Toit, concluded that ' the influence of 
increased evaporation upon the climate in South Africa 
would be negligible,' and recommended concentration 
upon irrigational aspects. Schwarz had however captured 
the imagination of the farming public of southern Africa, 
and speculation continued to be rife. A major investigation 
in 194.5, headed by the Union Minister of Lands, Senator 
A. M. Conroy, led to a report by L. A. McKenzie which 
discounted any significant bencfits for South Africa. This 
report seemed to kill finally the idea that climatic change 
could be introduced. I t  did not, however, rule out more 
limited engineering projects for irrigation in Bechuanaland. 
The concept now generally accepted is that the area of 
water should be limited and evaporation decreased rather 
than increased. Du Toit, Lord Hailey, Professor Debenham 
of Cambridge, and McKenzie, have a11 discussed different 
schemes of more limited scale. Debenham believes that some 
I 25,000 acres in the Mababe Depression could be irrigated 
from the Chobe River, and another roo,ooo acres irrigated 
along the Botletle River by diverting Okavango River 
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water. In his Water Resources of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 
he waxes enthusiastic, stating that given development, the 
Qkavanga delta 'can become a second Sudan, growing 
cotton or other products for export under somewhat similar 
conditions, always provided it has reasonable access to the 
sea9. Prospects for the favoured rail route through South 
West M i c a  will be discussed later. 
The 1960 economic survey mission appointed by Her 
Majesty's Government and headed by Professor Chandler 
Morse of Cornell University reviewed three years of prac- 
tical work by W. 6. Brind, and concluded that some irriga- 
tion development was immediately practicable. Looking 
at the region in 1964, it appears that the principal impedi- 
ments to development of the Qkavango delta generally fall 
into four categories : 
I.  Scientific Information. The need for better climatic data 
is obvious. The lower the rainfall, the more irregular, is a 
general rule. Whereas forty years may give reliable data in 
humid England, over a hundred years is to be preferred in 
dry Tanganyika (as the Groundnut Scheme showed) or 
Bechuanaland. What is the 'normal' size of Lake Ngami? 
What is the normal flow of the Chobe River? Is the apparent 
. . 
dessication of this part of Africa part of a progressive trend 
or a temporary fluctuation? Sufficient data are available 
on the slope of the land in the Okavango delta for minor 
projects to be undertaken, and also soil information is 
probably adequate for initial schemes such as irrigating 
the Mababe Depression. But great gaps remain in soil 
knowledge generally, and in knowledge of what can be 
economically grown. 
2. Engineering. An efficient and economical method of 
controlling the aquatic vegetation must be found if channels 
are to be kept open for reasonable flow, and evapo-trans- 
piration is to be controlled. Mechanical cutting machines 
are not as yet successful. Chemical control probably depends 
upon blocking the means of reproduction rather than 
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destroying existing plants. A whole new dimension has yet 
to be investigated in the Okavango, namely. the utilisation 
of vegetation for manufacture into cheap protein, as 
pioneered by Dr. N. W. Pirie, F.R.S., at the Rothampsted 
Experimental Research Station. If the waste product of 
cutting takes on an economic value, then the whole 
economics of vegetation control could be radically altered. 
My colleague Professor J. H. Wayland of the California 
Institute of Technology is optimistic that given sufficient 
research study, success can be achieved. 
Another essential advance lies in environmental health 
engineering to control tsetse fly and human sickness in the 
Okavango. Research is under way with limited funds, and 
so far limited success, in Ngamiland. 
3. Transportation. This probably means that in addition 
to tar roads, a railwav should be built a t  least north from 
the existing system. The present atrocious road from 
Francistown westward is a nightmare to drive over and 
highly costly in vehicle repairs. The ideal rail link would be 
through irrigated country to a West Coast port such as 
Walvis Bay, or a new harbour at the mouth of' Angola's 
Cunene River. 
4. Political. Co-operation with neighbouring states in the 
collection of data and overall planning for this part of 
African is necessary. A major Okavango scheme is likely to 
require a promise of political stability. 
On all scores, thcre is need for large sums of money for 
research and development. Bechuanaland will not be able 
to raise such funds from its own resources in the foresee- 
able future. Extra large sums make any project political. 
Will Britain wish to undertake the requisite financing for a 
country moving towards independence? Will a new and 
impoverished country be better off with the end of colonial 
rule and aid ? Will a burgeoning Bechuanaland nationalism 
and eventual independence provide the initial spark and 
the external confidence that the United Nations, or the 
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major world powers, would need to assist in the develop- 
ment of these water resources on a large scale? 
Professor Darrell Randall, in his dissertation published 
at  the University of Chicago in 1957, analyses the potential 
impact of Okavango development upon the lives of the 
local Batawana people and other human groups. He con- 
cludes that local people are simply unable to undertake 
responsibility for development. As a visitor to Maun, I was 
struck by the fact that the handful of Europeans catch more 
edible fish from the river than do the im~overished Africans. 
Yet when I talked to a group of Batawana and suggested 
that fish can be caught for virtually nothing, instead of 
spending money for meat in themarket-money thatcould go 
to build the secondarv school thev want-a tribal council 
spokesman replied, 'Yes, it is easy for you to say because 
you know about these things, but my people won't do it if 
I tell them.' They will, in time, no matter how impatient 
Bechuanas from other parts of the country become with 
them for their lack of initiative, but it will take a long time 
at  the present pace. Who is responsible for development? 
The lack of a firm answer. when added to the financial 
cost involved, is the reason development has not really 
begun. 
Whatever the scale of the successes that may eventually 
attend the utilisation of the water resources of northern 
Bechuanaland, it is fair to conclude today that the country 
is unable even to finance the preliminary work required to 
establish sufficient confidence for large-scale study. 
Transportation Infrastructure 
Despite its elephantine bulk, or perhaps because of the 
great distances involved, Bechuanaland is remarkably poorly 
equipped with public transportation. I t  has not been 
economically feasible to provide an adequate road network 
for the scattered population. In many ways, the B.P. is 
highly fortunate in that it has fairly good rail service through 
its most densely settled region, the east, because it is 
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traversed by the main line route from Johannesburg to 
Bulawayo. The ownership of this line by Rhodesian Rail- 
ways makes regulation of service difficult. After consider- 
able effort, the B.P. Administration was finally able to 
'desegregate' trains and dining cars while in the Protectorate. 
This had not been possible when South African dining cars 
were used over part of the track. Although many other 
rail links have been proposed, some of them narrow gauge, 
the only financially feasible one appears to be from the 
present rail station of Palapye to 'Lake Dow'. The latter is 
actually a normally dry basin, and part of the interior 
drainage of the Makarikari depression. If, as proposed, a 
canal is built to lead Qkavango River water past Maun to 
Lake Dow (itself a transport route), then it would probably 
justify being linked up with the line of rail. 
Bechuanaland lacks paved highways. Graded level roads 
cover about 1,200 miles, but the bulk of the 4,500 miles of 
koad' in the territory are mereIy tracks. Travel in four- 
wheeled vehicles is often hampered or blocked by very 
rough surfaces, loose sand, or flash floods. The Ghanzi 
block in the west is more easily reached by 180 miles to the 
railhead in South West Africa than the 400 dusty road miles 
from Lobatsi. The road westward to Maun is occasionally 
impassable. Public transport over these limited and inferior 
roads is poor, and a sense of isolation affects both farmers 
and administrators. The loan to Bechuanaland of £1.3 
million by the World Bank's International Development 
Association, for road communications including twelve 
bridges, will permit a substantial improvement in road 
conditions on several heavily travelled roads. The whole 
country has nine service stations for vehicles. Telegraph 
and telephone service has improved, but is still poor. 
Short-wave radios are an essential item, heavily relied upon 
by safari companies, service stations, the airline, police, 
and general administration. Air travel is almost too expen- 
sive for the administration of such a poor country, and 
there are no products which can pay for air freight. 
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The major travel improvement in recent ycars was the 
launching of a regular air servicc in Lobatsi by Captain 
Herbert Bartaunc. Opcratiiig three small Piper aircraft, 
and with two other pilots, Bartaune has provided thrice 
weekly or weekly flights to all principal points of the 
protectorate. I t  has made possible weekly meetings of the 
Executive Council, the rapid evacuation of many sick or 
injured people from places lacking hospitals or even a 
doctor, and permits key civil servants to visit field projects 
for first-hand study without losing an inordinate amount 
of time away from headquarters. I t  is dificult to assess 
the financial savings and greater efficiency promoted by 
this fledgling airline, but its favourable impact is noticeable 
throughout the territory. Scarce medical and technical 
personnel are used far more widely and at  lower salary 
cost for work accomplished through periodic visits to 
remote points. 
One factor not off~cially calculated upon in weighing up 
the pros and cons of the necessary Government subsidy of 
the airline is its role in stimulating national consciousness. 
Particularly in Ghanzi and in Maun, I found that educated 
and semi-educated people had gained a feeling of being far 
closer to other parts of the country. A sense of remoteness 
and often resulting antagonism for the Administration has 
been lessened by the regular flights. The airline, now 
operated by a Pretoria firm, does not directly affect the 
great majority of inhabitants, but indirectly it is making a 
major contribution to the sense of a Bechuana nation. 
b o n g  the private fliers in the B.P. is Wenela, the 
company which recruits for the gold mines of the Witwaters- 
rand and Free State gold fields. Wenela actually controls 
the Francistown airfield and operates the largest equipment 
regularly flown in the territory, a DC-3 which flies recruits, 
many of them who have come south from Angola, out to 
the Maun airport. It  was on the Wenela airfield that an 
East African DC-3 was sabotaged and burned in 1963. 
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The cost of aircraft o~erat ion in Bechuanaland is much 
lower than it otherwise would be because of the excellent 
overhaul facilities and spares depot available in Pretoria 
and at Jan Smuts airports in the Republic. Various South 
African private companies have bid to operate subsidised 
services in the B.P. Civil control of the headcluarters would 
then rest with the Republican authorities, although opera- 
tions in Bechuanaland would have to comply with Protec- 
torate laws. 
Finance and Planning 
Bechuanaland has been slow to develop for many reasons 
already outlined. Total Government reGenue in 1948 was 
under L5  million. Grants-in-aid from the U.K. began in 
I g56and rose until they nowaccount for one-third ofa budget 
in excess of LIB million. The B.P.'s share of customs income 
with South Africa for 1962-63 is estimated at ~280,000. 
The B.P., even more than most colonial territories, had 
been left for decades to try to raise itself by its bootstraps. 
Today, its social and economic stirring is directly attribut- 
able to grants and loans from the British Government. I t  
is not likely that Great Britain would continue to make up a 
major annual deficit in an independent country, nor is it 
likely that other foreign powers will assume a regular 
subsidy burden. Thus, financing becomes a major barrier to 
independence to a degree that scarcely existed for most 
newly-independent former British territories in Africa. As 
the ]Economic Survey Mission put it bluntly in 1960, without 
a marked improvement in the economy there is no prospect 
that the Protectorate revenues can suffice unaided to meet 
its ordinary recurrent ex~cnditures on the bare minimum 
of public services. Unless there is economic development, 
there can be no full and stable independence. 
The 1963-68 Bechuanaland Development Plan is the 
first comprehensive and carefully worked out effort to list 
targets and the means whereby they can be met. I t  involves 
the expenditure of over ~12,ooo,ooo, of which a quarter is 
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to be spent on the stimulation of production and exports. But 
the plan has inherent limitations. In the planners' own 
words, 'In the absence of a statistical organisation, which in 
most countries enables planners to attempt a more detailed 
diagnosis of economic problems, to set quantitative targets 
and to evaluate past programmes exactly, a pragmatic 
approach has to be adopted towards development planning 
in Bechuanaland.' 
The plan called for EI 1,279,000 in external aid. Local 
taxes are to be used, but their revenue-generating potential 
is extremely low. Stimulation in the private sector is stressed. 
The primary assistance is through development of infra- 
structure. But in conditioning the mass of the population 
to economic growth, the Government is actively at work 
on such a key issue as land tenure reform. Various loan 
schemes are in operation and a National Development Bank 
is envisaged. Tax concessions to attract foreign capital are 
also viewed in a favourable light. 
External trade has not been easy to balance for the B.P., 
and the value of imports has run some 20 per cent higher 
than the value of exports, or an unfavourable balance of 
the order of E5oo,ooo, in recent years. This is, of course, 
natural for a developing country spending grant and loan 
money, and the problems of credit are not serious while 
Bechuanaland remains within the British ambit. However, 
an independent African Government would now face 
staggering problems in its trade balance, credit, and in its 
currency, if the last were not tied to sterling. If it is not 
possible to reduce the jC;5oo,ooo spent on vehicles each year 
or to manufacture locally much of the ~1,500,000 worth 
of general merchandise, an African Government in exchange 
difficulties would very likely attempt to cut down on the 
~500,ooo worth of imported grain and grain meal by 
growing more grain locally and by substituting locally 
grown produce. Fertiliscr, which has been accounting for 
under &~oo,ooo in annual imports, is sure to rise in impor- 
tance and will climb rapidly if a crash programme of local 
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grain production gets under way. The point is again obvious : 
these imports are relatively inexpensive for value received 
by world standards because they are bought on tlie low- 
priced South African market. Alternative and more distant 
sources of supply could raise prices exorbitantly. 
Internal political considerations are important in the 
development plan. The argument is advanced that increases 
in the regular Government budget are undesirable in that 
the creation of a permanently unbalanced budget would be a 
crippling imposition upon an independent Government. 
There is no easy way out for the British Government. If 
it does give large sums, their withdrawal will upset an 
African Government; if they are continued, it will be neo- 
colonialism; and if additional funds are not given either 
time, the charge of neglect will hold water. This conundrum 
arises not only from current financial policies, but because 
Bechuanaland, along with Basutoland and Swaziland, was 
terribly neglected in the lons pre-World War I1 period 
when the whole concept of' aiding undeveloped territories 
with outside financing was not yet generally accepted. 
Political factors also dictate the announced priority of 
education over medicine. The very real role of education 
in medical improvements is evident in such diseases as 
tuberculosis, where the barrier in the B.P. is not medical 
knowledge but an inability of the patients and their families 
to understand and carry out instructions. 
The cost of the Gaberones capital will account for one- 
fifth of expenditure under the plan. This high proportion 
is defended on the grounds that the creation of a national 
symbol is essential to the primacy of national interests 
over purely tribal ones, in turn a prerequisite of economic 
growth. Furthermore, the Africanisation of the civil service, 
first politically and in turn economically desirable, was not 
really feasible at Mafeking, Cape Province. If any part 
of the development costs is underestimated, it is likely to be 
the creation of the new capital. 
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The 1963-68 plan is the first real effort to involve non- 
British financial resources in assisting Government schemes. 
The principal appeal is to the United Nations for help in 
research on hydrology, tsetse, fauna, livestock, and educa- 
tion. Actual work is envisiuned in rural literacy, in con- 
ducting a census, giving agricultural credit, and in road 
building. Modest help is also budgeted for from the Oxford 
Committee for Famine Relief and the Freedom from 
Hunger Campaign. But the bulk of financial aid will con- 
tinue to come from the United Kingdom Government. 
The Development Plan envisages local revenue as being 
onlyslightly greater than grant-in-aid in theearly years of the 
plan, but that by 1967-68, local revenues will have increased 
some 80 per cent, while the grant-in-aid will have dropped 
10 per cent. That is a long time to look ahead in Bechuana- 
land, and the planners stress the need for yearly adjustments 
in their estimates and goals. I t  is really not so much a five- 
year plan as a rolling plan for the next five years, readjusted 
annually. 
The B.P. plan is fairly straightforward in attempting to 
apply some oil to all parts of a creaky economic machine, 
and to increase both income from cattle and the education 
of the people. Almost no money is planned for totally new 
directions of development. The planned research on peasant 
farm units must precede any major expenditures. With 
such a limited budget, a major effort cannot be made on 
the Okavango Scheme. Here it is hoped that the United 
Nations or even outside private investment will lend a hand 
with what can be an extremely expensive and potentially 
extremely rewarding avenue of development. 
In the final analysis, the colonial power governing a 
poor country such as Bechuanaland is wise not to risk its 
small competence on major gambles, but instead to move 
ahead more slowly but safely with the host of pedestrian 
projects such as dispensaries, small dams, land surveying, 
schools, roads and veterinary services. Heavy pressures on 
an African Government for spectacular advances may 
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develop with autonomy. If a Government is duly elected 
by the people and there is national consensus to follow a 
risky, if potentially rewarding, path, then an African Govern- 
ment can do this without the same political dangers, or 
as bitter recriminations, as if a colonial Government 
gambled and lost. If Britain can continue to make up for 
years of neglect and in time turn over an improving country 
with revenue and expenses as nearly balanced as possible, 
it will have produced a base of action for Mrican leadership. 
What financial help an African Government will attract 
from the world or closer at home from already independent 
African states is not easily predictable. Nos is it easy to 
fortell how successful it may be in igniting a national spirit 
among its own people to march forward economically. 
IV. BECNUANALAND'S  E X T E R N A L  
RELATIONS 
STRATEGICALLY, Bechuanaland is one of the most impor- 
tant countries on the African continent. That is an assertion 
rather than accepted fact, but the evidence to support it 
is impressive. 
At the 1963 General Assembly of the United Nations, 
it was the view of the American delegation that in the sudden 
absence of cold war tension, and apart from Cuba, the 
Middle East and the question of mainland China's member- 
ship, the four most important issues all lay in southern 
Africa, to wit: Southern Rhodesia, Angola, South West 
Africa and South Africa. All these countries have major 
borders with Bechuanaland except for Angola, whose 
border is only thirty miles away across sparsely inhabited 
territory. An independent Bechuanaland would mean that, 
for the first time, a free African nation had a common 
border with South Africa. (The contact between Northern 
Rhodesia and South West Africa or the remote Caprivi 
Strip has nothing like the strategic importance sf Bechuana- 
land, whose longer border is close to the huge population 
centres and vital industry of the Witwatersl-and.) 
If there is major guerrilla warfare or unconditional 
military fighting between the Pan-African states and the 
Republic, the easiest approach from the north is through 
the B.P. On the other hand, the openness of the country 
and lack of cover militates against surprise and concealment 
such as would be possible on other borders, particularly 
that of Mozambique, with the Republic. 
With or without armed conflict on the borders of Bechu- 
analand, the role of the Protectorate will loom importantly 
in the debates of the United Nations. In the absence of 
overriding threats to world peace, the wishes of the largest 
continental bloc at  the United Kationr, which constitutes a 
third of its membership, will have a high priority at  future 
meetings of the General Assembly. If nothing else unites the 
diverse leadership of the newly-independent states of Africa, 
they are drawn together by a dislike of a system of govern- 
ment which appears to be based upon a belief in the 
superiority of a white skin over a dark skin, regardless of 
any other factor. Granted the pressures which will exist at  
the United Nations, and assuming that South Africa con- 
tinues to appear intransigent and Portugal somewhat less 
so, the most obvious target for effective pressure will be the 
United Kingdom. In most recent sessions, Rhodesia has 
often held the spotlight, not because African nations felt 
it was more important than South Africa, but because the 
opportunities of applying effective pressures were so much 
greater. Just as South West Africa is judged the most 
effective way of closing in on South Africa, so pressure on 
the U.K. over Bechuanaland may be the most effective 
way of further involving Britain in the southern Africa 
struggle. 
I t  is not unlikely that one or more individual events in 
Bechuanaland-involving Pan-African revolutionary ele- 
ments and the South African Government-will become the 
focus for a major debate in the United Nations. Not only 
would the nations in Africa be aligned on one side or the 
other, but the whole galaxy of world powers on opposite 
sides of the cooling war-the U.S.S.R., the U.S., and the 
neutralist bloc-would be included. In the wings, Red 
China would stand prepared to take advantage of any 
Soviet hesitancy in adopting a militant position. The claim 
that South West Africa at  present represents a threat 
to world peace would have the same degree of validity as 
some kinds of political tension in Bechuanaland. 
Thus, it appears that Bechuanaland, the subject of whose 
external relations would have been as dry as Kalahari dust 
a decade ago, has a strategic significance far beyond her 
population nr economic strength. 
78 BECHUANALAND 
Relations with South Africa 
The outstanding facts from the long history of Bechuana- 
land's relations with the Republic are Britain's under- 
standing with South Africa that eventually the territory 
would become part of South Africa, and Britain's commit- 
ment to the Bechuana people that any change of sovereignty 
would not take place without their consent. I t  is not con- 
ceivable that any foreseeable British Government would 
honour the first promise at  the price of dishonouring the 
second. 
However, that is not to say that Bechuanas will not 
continue to fear such an eventuality. Certainly, those fears 
will be exploited and played upon for diverse political ends. 
They were once again aroused on 3 September 1963, by 
a speech by Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd in Pre- 
toria. The South African Premier began his first extensive 
public comment on the High Commission Territories by 
good neighbourly remarks and, surprisingly, mentioned 
both the Ganyile and Abrahams cases. In the former, South 
African police had crossed into Basutoland a few yards 
further than was their legal right to kidnap a suspect and 
maintained their innocence for eighteen months before 
releasing the African politician with compensation. The 
later and better known case of kidnapping was carried out 
inside Bechuanaland by South African police from South 
West Africa in civilian clothes, and it was generally accepted 
that they were acting on their own with excessive zeal. Dr. 
Verwoerd acknowledged these mistakes and pointed to the 
rectification made by releasing both men. He then com- 
plained about the use of South African airspace between 
Swaziland and Bechuanaland as an escape route. He 
described what he was trying to do in the Transkei as 
similar to Britain's objectives in the Protectorates. 
Prime Minister Verwoerd reaffirmed that his Govern- 
ment had. no kemihsid ambitions and con~raued, 'Indeed, 
were they under our guardianship, South Africa would free 
them stage by stage, just as she is doing in the Transkei.' 
He then outlined what South Africa would do if it had 
responsibility for the High Commission territories. He would 
make them 'democratic states in which the masses would not 
be dominated by small groups of authoritarians'. He would 
steer them 'away from the principle of multi-racism' and 
give the whites who remained a vote in South Africa. He 
would also exchange certain areas at present in the Protec- 
torate for others now lying within the Republic, and said 
this would be of primary advantage to Africans. Lastly, he 
would apply the border industries concept in South Africa 
to the High Commission Territories, so that while political 
rule would be in African hands, much of the African 
employment would be across the border in South African 
factories. 
There followed his "challenge9 to Great Britain to allow 
the inhabitants of the territories to decide whose assistance 
they preferred. 
The world Press reacted with great swiftness and heat. 
Its general line was that South Africa was again trying to 
put into effect the original understanding that it would 
eventually take over the territorites. Many commen- 
tators implied the use of military force. Copies of Dr. 
Verwoerd's remarks were not available, and the world Press 
was dependent upon the hasty notes of local newsmen at  the 
time he spoke. In an effort to catch up with the first stories, 
a statement was issued two days later in Pretoria. I t  
emphasised that 'no offer was made to the United Kingdom 
to "annex9' or "take eves" or "incorporate" or "administery9 
these territories.' I t  underlined Britain's responsibility to 
consult the inhabitants before making any changes such as 
would lead to the Republic's being a 'guide and guardian'. 
The Prime Minister emphasised that incorporation 'was 
not sought since this was against my ~ove rnm~nt ' s  policy of 
separate development which has as its objective the political 
independence of the Bantu naeion'. He also declared that 
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those who would deny South Africa the chance to put its 
case to the people of the territories were exposing their 
'fear' of truth. 
In  part, the proposals were genuinely misunderstood, but 
in even greater part, some critics of South Africa seized 
upon the statement as one which they could twist to make 
political capital. The whole affair revealed a profound 
knderestimz&ion of world o~in ion  on the part of Dr. 
Verwoerd's advisers and a misjudgment of Press reaction. 
Had such an essentially economic proposal-whatever the 
~olitical motivations behind it-been set forth clearlv and 
unequivocally in a major policy statement, copies of which 
would have been available to journalists in South Africa 
and through South African embassies abroad, and possibly 
even through some full-page newspaper advertisements 
such as were used for the Transkei announcements, then 
the criticism would have been more of what actually was 
said and less of what the commentators ex~ected would 
have been said. 
Although the issue has been raised in the United Nations, 
the practical political consequences of South Africa taking 
over Bechuanaland by military force in any situation short 
of war between South Africa and Pan-African states are 
such as to make the move highly unlikely. Nothing would 
give South Africa's foes greater pleasure than for the 
Republic to make an overt and aggressive move outside 
its own borders. Many nations, particularly those in Western 
Europe, who share a repugnance for racial discrimination, 
are inhibited from action against South Africa because of 
a deep conviction that they would be interfering in the in- 
ternal politics of a sovereign nation. All moral reservations 
could be swept away if South Africa were to seize Bechuana- 
land. 
Similar considerations operate against South Africa's 
military assistance to the white minority Governments of 
Southern Rhodesia and Angola. South Africa has a vital 
stake, in the Portuguese achieving a modus uivencli with 
African nationalism and thus protecting South Africa's 
flanks in Angola and Mozambique. But, despite South 
Africa's interest in helping the hard-pressed Portuguese, 
the military assistance has been almost nil. A few planeloads 
of small arms were sent secretly to Angola in the early days 
of the revolt, but nothing approaching the kind of aid the 
United States gives to many nations with which it is only 
lukewarm friends, or the kind of military equipment the 
Soviet Union and Wed China supply to countries only 
peripherally affecting their own policies. 
Diplomatic statements must obviously be analysed as to 
whether they make sense to the country concerned. A senior 
South African diplomat's comment to the writer, that if 
South Africa took over Bechuanaland it would make a farce 
of the Bantustan policy, has a logic consistent with South 
Africa's stated goals. As he pointed out, 'South Africa is 
engaged in a policy of spinning off territories with a large 
African population. The Transkei is far from independent in 
1964, but the trend towards some measure of autonomy 
for various African-settled parts of the Republic is undeni- 
able. This is true even if one is convinced that such areas 
are not economically viable or that independence for them 
is no solution to the political demands of millions of Africans 
in the so-called "white areas".' 
Any attempt to slow up even limited autonomy, or the 
drastic step of acquiring peacefully by treaty, or of physically 
seizing additional territory with an African majority, makes 
no sense at all if there is a shred of sincerity in the Bantustan 
programme. This is an argument based on the theory of 
separate development. i n  fact, and a number of leading 
South African officials will put this point privately, the 
exact opposite is the case; the High Commission Territories, 
and perhaps Bechuanaland in particular, are essential 
to making South Afiica9s case. The reasoning is as follows: 
pressures are building up against the Republic and it will 
be some years before the Transkei could really be indepen- 
dent. i n  the Transkei development, South Africa will be 
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in a dilemma between giving political control to a poor and 
woefully backward (if potentially highly productive) 
agricultural region, and pouring in many millions of Rand 
as she is now doing to raise the economic level, but post- 
poning any real independence because of the economic 
dependence created. I t  is doubtful if the Transkei could 
generate 25 per cent of its internal financial needs within five 
years. The rest is at present coming from the South African 
taxpayer, and some of that tax money represents the sweat 
from the brow of migrant Xhosa from the Transkei. Thus, 
the interrelationship will continue for some time and 
fail to allow the world actually to judge-for sure-whether 
or not South Africa is sincere about its separate development 
or Bantustan programme. 
This is where Bechuanaland enters behind the scenes in 
South African thinking. No one has any doubts that Great 
Britain and not South Africa has political control in the 
B.P. Even if there has to be outside financial assistance to 
Bechuanaland, it is still possible for that country to achieve 
independence in a few years. The Bechuanas may insist 
upon financial links which could, in some ways, appear to 
limit their independence. However, such links would prob- 
ably be less limiting than those accompanying South 
Africa's economic aid and retention of political controls in 
the Transkei and in subsequent Bantustans. 
It  is against this background that South African state- 
ments regarding the B.P. must be viewed. Bechuanaland 
could become, in South African thinking, an independent 
African state bordering on South Africa and benefiting 
materially from close economic ties. If South Africa were 
thus able to help finance such an African state and to 
maintain normal diplomatic relations with it, there would 
be far less doubt about her ability to grant similar status to 
large parts of South Alrica where overwhelming Afi-ica.n 
populations are located. 
Such a development would, of course, require a drastic 
seGsion of present Sou& Nrimn oEcial and private 
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attitudes towards African diplomats. Various pro-Govern- 
ment newspapers, led by Die Burger in Gape Town, and 
often followed up by Dagbreek en Sondagnuus (Chairman of 
the Board, Dr. Verwoerd) in Johannesburg, have been 
insisting for a long time that South Africa must receive 
African didomats %om the Transkei, as well as from other 
parts of Africa, with precisely the same degree of courtesy 
and non-segregated facilities as are accorded any other 
diplomats. The necessity for this is widely recognised among 
senior members of the South African Government, and 
particularly among its diplomats. 
The obvious question an outsider asks is: "Why, if 
Mricans enjoying-diplomatic status and even businessmen 
from outside South Africa can be treated on the basis of 
merit and not colour, cannot this same treatment be applied 
to all Africans with similar education and cultural values 
within the country?' The answer lies less in racial feeling 
than in power politics. I t  is often overlooked that at  heart the 
Afrikaner nationalist is far less interested in oppressing than 
he is determined not to be oppressed. The p e a t  thrust of his 
history has been to overthrow British colonialism-including 
neo-colonialism-and petty discrimination. As Minister of 
Defence Tim Fouche told his Bloemfontein constituents in 
" 
I 963, Tn the world today one race cannot dominate another 
race.' I t  is precisely the power aspects which would create 
a situation of equal treatment for an African diplomat but 
less than equal tieatment of a local African professor, though 
even the latter's position might possibly be improved by the 
change of attitude towards the diplomat. 
If &is has a cuckooland quality to it, one must recall that 
a strikingly similar situation still persists in the United 
States today. When large numbers of African diplomats 
began arriving in Washington and for the United Nations 
in New York, they were soon able to go into residential 
areas, restaurants, and other public facilities from which 
Americans of African descent were barred. They still have 
an advantage in most parts of the American South. I t  is an 
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often repeated stunt for an American Negro who can speak 
French -or Spanish to put on a turban and robes to gain 
access to many places in the southern states where he could 
not gain admission in a grey flannel suit. I t  was Momla 
Gbedemah, then Minister of Finance in Ghana, who 
deliberatelv broke the colour bar in some Howard Tohnson 
- 
restaurants in Maryland by precipitating a famous incident 
over a glass of orange juice. 
The parallel of African diplomats gradually gaining 
acceptance for all people of colour is conceivable in South 
Africa. Indeed, the thought is used with a reverse twist by 
some racists in South Africa as a reason for resisting the 
- 
proposed non-discriminatory treatment of African diplo- 
mats. I have travelled in South Africa with fellow Americans 
of African descent and stayed at the best hotels, etc., without 
anything but the most courteous treatment, although this 
is most unusual. The change would not be so great as might 
be imagined. 
The official Bechuanaland Government position vis-2-vis 
South Africa was defined as one of 'strictest neutrality9 in 
the interests of 'a vigourous and uncompromising advance 
towards an independent, stable, prosperous and non-racial 
state9, in the words of the Queen's Commissioner Peter 
Fawcus to the B.P. Legislature in November, 1963. He 
described the policy as 'a counsel of caution but not of 
timidity'. Refererring to those 'with whom we must trade 
if we are to live', he pointed to the wisdom that has been 
'learned by all the small nations which have succeeded in 
preserving their independence in the modern world9. The 
statement on external affairs was possible because of the 
change of title of the Resident Commissioner to that of Her 
Majesty's Commissioner with the status of a Governor. 
Mr. Fawcus commented further inter alia: 
I have been left in no doubt during recent months that the strong 
determination of responsible people in Bechuanaland is that the 
territory shall not become a mere pawn in international politics, 
or an instrument for any action against other territories, because 
the people of the territory have more important and more reward- 
ing things to do for themselves. 
At the same time Bechuanaland will continue to give asylum 
to persons who if they return to South Africa would face loss of 
liberty as a consequence of political opinion or acts expressed or 
performed before they left South Africa. 
In this we shall be upholding the traditions and beliefs of 
Bechuanaland as well as of Great Britain. 
Mr. Fawcus's declared policy provided the justification 
for the refusal of political asylum to three South West 
African leaders, who had been living in Tanganyika and 
who sought to enter Bechuanaland from Northern Rhodesia. 
In  March 1964, Mr. Sam Nujoma, Mr. Jacob Kahangua 
and Mr. Emil Appolus arrived, they said to make arrange- 
ments for refugees from South West Africa now in Bechuana- 
land to proceed to Dar es Salaam. The three men had no 
passports or travel documents and refused to be fingerprinted 
as the immigrants law requires. 
Most of the foregoing discussion of South Africa and 
Bechuanaland relations anticipates a larger role for local 
leadership in Bechuanaland. Present political relationships 
are between South Africa and Great Britain. But let us shift 
our vantage point to the B.P. itself and consider the attitudes 
of the two major parties to the Republic. Their differences 
on this question are probably the deepest ones which divide 
them. The Bechuanaland Democratic Party's attitude to 
the Republic certainly accounts in large part for how the 
various class and racial groups line up. If this attitude does 
not change, it may well be that a majority of the Pan-African 
states will support the Bechuanaland People's Party rather 
than the B.D.P., in so far as they concern themselves with 
the internal politics of Bechuanaland. 
One could step back from the political heat of the South 
African attitudes and say with perhaps greater truth that 
the Democratic Party is more concerned with the economic 
life of the territory and with raising its living standards and 
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less concerned with anti-British feeling (assuming independ- 
ence is round the corner in any case) or even anti-South 
African actions on behalf of a broader African cause. The 
People's Party has not had time, in Matante9s words, 'to 
think about our economic policy'. His opponent, Quett 
Masire, has been effective at  political meetings by saying 
that his party was interested in what was best for Bechuana- 
land-not what some outside (African) politicians wanted 
Bechuanaland to do for them. On joining with South Africa, 
Masire says, 'South Africa and the High Commission 
Territories have reached a point of no return in the respec- 
tive courses they have chosen. I t  is a well known fact that 
the Republic and ourselves are poles apart.' 
The attitude of Seretse Khama, Masire, and the Demo- 
cratic Party generally towards South Africa is to criticise 
severely, in plain fact to abhor, policies involving discrimin- 
ation on the basis of race. But there is no 'Black MusIim' 
justification for segregation. Likewise, the official British 
position is absolutely against any form of racial bias and a 
good many individual oficials go much further than the 
official line in their criticism of Republican policies. But 
when it comes to non-political matters, the Democratic 
leaders soberly point out over and over again the financial 
advantages now accruing to the territory from present 
economic arrangements with the Republic. These not only 
include favourable customs arrangements (and here 
Swaziland probably is at a disadvantage), but the host of 
small yet significant technical relationships referred to 
earlier. For example, the Republic veterinary laboratory 
furnishes a great deal of free advice and serums for Bechu- 
analand, as it does for some independent African states. 
If an African or European has an unusual or severe illness, 
there are African and European medical specialists avail- 
able only a few hours away in Johannesburg. Bechuanaland 
has no medical specialists, nor even a single dentist, for that 
matter. Technical experts in such diverse subjects as well 
drilling, short-wave radio repair and crystallography are 
available nearby at low cost. 
Although South Africa is gradually reducing the numbers 
of workers it will admit from neighbouring territories, and 
complaints are coming from Bechuanas about employment 
doors closing, the monthly receipts of workcrs in the 
Republic play a significant role in territorial finances, not 
to mention the acquisition of skills. South Africa is the 
largest wage employer of Bechuanas, and it furnishes 
the bulk of skilled personnel to the Protectorate. Access to 
the sea for critical exports, as well as most normal import 
routes, is through Cape Town's docks. 
South Africa is an important supplier of Bechuanaland's 
needs and especially of unusual services at  relatively low 
cost. Conversely, South Africa needs Bechuanaland labour 
or would suffer temporary dislocation in gold mining with- 
out it. The B.P. is a good market for South Africa's secondary 
industries, and South Africa makes a good middleman profit 
on much that is imported to Bechuanaland. 
But the economic balance, a force unrelated to political 
rights and wrongs, is overwhelmingly on the side of South 
Africa. I t  underlines the force of the dilemma that any 
nation or group of nations who wish to break Bechuanaland's 
ties with South Africa must offer immediate economic 
succour, or ask the Bechuanas to pay a heavy price in 
human suffering. Poverty is a constant cousin to most 
Bechuanas. Wise chiefs still require three years storage of 
grain before allowing a surplus to be sold. But no chiefs 
have the financial resources among their people to withstand 
the cessation of human and trade intercourse between the 
two countries unless major assistance is forthcoming. 
But what of the legal position between the two countries? 
Under South African law, Bechuanaland has been a foreign 
territory for travel purposes since July 1963 under provisions 
of the Commonwealth Relations Bill of 1962. Great Britain 
is directly involved with South Africa on behalf of the High 
Commission Territories in the question of air rights. The 
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fairly frequent use of Swaziland and Basutoland as havens 
for refugees has often been followed by clandestine charter 
flights across South Africa to Bechuanaland. In a few 
instances, particularly the flight of Patrick Duncan from 
Basutoland to Bechuanaland, the South African police 
probably had an advance tip-off, and the South African air 
force could have intercepted the twin-engine Piper aircraft if 
such an act had been called f0r.l After later refugee flights, 
South Africa unilaterally barred overflights and threatened 
to revoke the licenses of the local air operators who had been 
doing refugee flying. Access to the Basutoland enclave is not 
barred, but planes must land in the Republic. This is South 
Africa's right under the Chicago Convention. South African 
fighters have forced down a plane from Basutoland which at  
first ignored instructions. 
At what point might South Africa ring down an iron 
curtain on the B.P. boundary? There has been occasional 
provocation-more in statements than legally. Bechuana- 
land's Government has insisted that refugees-all of whom 
are welcomed-will not stand in Bechuanaland and literally 
or figuratively fire into the Republic. South Africa will 
gradually build up more fences and heavier patrols of the 
border to prevent wanted saboteurs or political organisers 
from escaping, just as it will attempt to control more 
closely the influx of guerrilla weapons and those who would 
organise revolt. 
O n  balance, South Africa is unlikely to be provoked into 
a hasty closing down of the Bechuanaland border. Such a 
move would cast Bechuanaland adrift to fend economically 
for itself and almost inevitably it would then become an 
armed base against the Republic with or without British 
Duncan, the son of the first South African-born Governor General, 
was the founder and for a long time the Editor of Contact magazine; 
he was also a prominent member of the South African Liberal Party. 
He left South Africa on a British passport and without an exit permit 
at a time when an order was in force against him under the Suppression 
of Communism Act, confining him to Cape Town for five years. 
acquiescence. World opinion would notch up anoiher black 
mark against South Africa and, more important in political 
terms, white South Africans would feel a sense of isolation 
and of retreat behind an uncertain barrier. South Africa 
has a trump card in its essential and, indeed, generous 
economic support of Bechuanaland, but a trump can only 
be played once, and then it is gone. 
South West Africa 
If, as is often suggested, Bechuanaland is not economically 
viable, the question arises of its association with other states. 
The links discussed with South Africa are economically the 
most logical, and politically the least likely. A tie with South 
West Africa has seldom been considered for the obvious 
reason that both territories are desperately poor and 
undeveloped. However, South West Africa today has one 
of the best potentials in Africa for a high per capita income. 
Considered as a separate country from the Republic, with 
the world's richest diamond mines and oE-shore recovery, 
the booming fishing and canning industry, the success of 
karakul (Persian Lamb) ranching, the unique Tsumeb ore 
body, the finds of semi-precious stones, and the mainstay 
cattle industry, South West Afi-ica is moderately wealthy. 
Most of the capital is external, and most of the profits 
are sent outside-South West Afi-ica, but even when that is 
taken into account, the prospects ibr the relatively small 
population (500,ooo) are excellent. 
Both Soutli West and the B.P. are sparsely settled, and, 
along with Mauritania, have the lowest population density 
in Africa. Vegetationally, both are cattle countries and 
populated by cattle tribes. Africans are not the only cattle 
people there; the livelihood of a majority of Europeans in 
both territories is intimately associated with livestock. 
Bechuanaland is probably capable of a considerable expan- 
sion in meat exports, as various U.K. commissions have 
concluded. Pf one examines a map showing areas within 
fifty miles of the southern and eastern borders of the B.P., 
go BECHUANALAND 
one is immediately struck by the far greater ranching 
development on the South and South West Africa sides of 
the border, under the same climatic conditions. I t  would 
seem technically feasible, putting racial issues aside for the 
moment, that skilled management in South West Africa 
could take the lead in expanding the B.P. livestock industry. 
A second area of mutual interest between South West 
Africa and the B.P. is transport. We have seen how the 
Ghanzi block has partially changed its orientation from 
Gobabis in South West Africa to Lobatsi. But, as I have 
suggested, it is conceivable that the whole of Bechuanaland 
would be most efficiently linked with the outside world by 
a rail line to Walvis Bay. 
The 1952 British mission to investigate the possibilities 
of economic development in the Western Kalaharil were 
in favour of a southerly route from the present railhead 
at  Gobabis in South West Africa to Lobatsi. An alternative 
route, first surveyed in 1931 by Mr. Jeffares of Rhodesian 
Railways, strikes northwest from Ghanzi to reach the 
Rhodesian line just south of Livingstone. The route would 
serve Ngamiland and the northern B.P., while in no way 
duplicating the existing line from Lobatsi to Francistown, 
and west to Bulawayo. An obvious advantage to Zambia of 
a west coast port for goods destined for Europe lies in the 
great saving of distance around southern Africa from Beira. 
A proposal in late 1963 by the London firm of Lonrho 
envisaged a ,(;20 million coal-by-pipe project from the 
Wankie Collieries in Rhodesia across northern Bechuana- 
land to South West Africa. The company already has 
extensive land and mining holdings in central Africa. A 
spokesman expected that four million tons of granulated 
coal a year could be flushed through the pipe each year by 
using one million gallons of water every day. The coal would 
be used to produce power at  the American-owned Tsumeb 
mine, and would then carry on to the Atlantic coast. The 
1 The members were A. Gaitskell, C. U. Pickrel?, B. Curry, Tshekedi 
Khama, Bathoen 11, and L. van der Post. 
intensive South African efforts to develop northern South 
West Africa economically may lead to the exploitation of 
an iron ore deposit estimated at 200 million tons in the 
Kaokoveld, and the building of a new Atlantic seaport. The 
proposed pipeline could, with considerable dificulty, be 
routed through the Caprivi Strip, but northern Bechuana- 
land would be a far more likely route. 
Other possible developments than those proposed by 
Lonrho would also involve an Atlantic port and a rail link 
across northern B.P. All such proposals would lead to closer 
economic association of the two cattle countries. 
The practical difficulties of construction of either the 
northern or southern trans-Kalahari line are not in- 
superable. Walvis Bay has had ,(;~,OOO,OOO in new railway 
facilities and steady harbour expansion. The line from the 
port to Windhoek would need heavier rails and ballast for 
increased traffic. For the new construction, hills, curves, 
sand, and rivers are not major obstacles. Experts anticipate 
that adequate water would be found, and-its pesence is 
less critical in railway technology than when such a route 
was first proposed. 
Thequestionof traffic potential from Zambiaand Rhodesia 
is involved with political questions which we will come to 
shortly. Northern Bechuanaland would be much closer to 
Walvis Bay than to Cape Town. hTo one can foretell with 
certaintv the political future of South West Africa, If it 
were independent, and agreed to construction of a Kalahari 
route, then the B.P. would find itself free of dependence 
upon the South African Railways. However, any such 
speculation must also take into account that in law Walvis 
Bay is not at  present part of South West Africa, but an 
enclave of the Cape Province, and thus part of the Republic 
of South Afi-ica proper. Whatever World Court and United 
Nations decisions are made about South West Africa, 
technically they would not apply to the harbour of Walvis 
Bay. I t  is not however the only possible South West African 
harbour terminus for a Kalahari railway. 
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Kalahari lions will kill many thousands of buck before 
some of these speculations are proved true or otherwise, 
but they are not far-fetched. Recently, the leader of the 
South West Afi-ica People's Organisation, Dr. Mburumba 
Merina, was staying for some weeks at the home of Vice- 
President Matante of the Bechuanaland People's Party in 
Francistown, following many world travels and frequent 
petitions at the United Kations. They each told me of their 
long discussions on the possible joining of their two countries 
when and if each of them gained political power. 
Tsumeb-born Kerina left South West Africa in 1953, and 
is under threat of arrest on South African soil. He returned 
to the vicinity of South West Africa with his American wife 
and children with the announced intention of proceeding 
to South M7est Africa. Whether Kerina, having returned 
from visits to many parts of the Communist and non- 
Communist worlds, and particularly from the United 
Nations, is technically a refugee from South West Africa, 
was not immediately clear to the Bechuanaland Adminis- 
tration. 
With this must be linked the presence in Ngarniland of a 
large number of Hereros. These are the flourishing descend- 
ants (in most cases) of Hereros who fled South West Africa 
in pre-World War I days of German authority, after General 
von Trotha issued his infamous order that the Hereros 
must be 'exterminated'. Despite more than a generation in 
exile, sentiment runs strongly for return to South West 
Africa. The Hereros are a potential source of trouble in 
Bechuanaland, but not because of irredentist tendencies. 
They simply want to return home, and are a potential 
source of embarrassment between the South African and 
British Governments. Britain cannot seem to encourage 
a group of Africans to move voluntarily under South African 
control, and the South Akicans are not sure where they 
would put the homecomers witl~out displacing other 
indigenous Southwesters. Even if the two countries were 
united, the desire to return to their 'homeland' would 
probably be as strong. The Hereros that the writer inter- 
viewed around Maun seemed to care far more for a sense 
of tribe and tribal homeland than the flag flying over the 
local police station. 011 the other hand, the writer gained 
the impression from a long meeting with the Herero 
patriarch, Chief Hosea Kutako, and his councillors in 
Windhoek, that they preferred a closer tribal link with the 
Ngamiland Hereros rather than their physical return. 
Bechuanaland's borders with South West Afiica involve 
the territory in the whole question of the United Nations 
attempting to impose its conclusion upon the South African 
Government. If a point of physical confrontation is reached, 
Great Britain might well be asked to co-operate with the 
United Nations in allowing access through Bechuanaland. 
This issue arose once before when a peaceful United Nations 
group under Professor Fabregat of Uruguay wished to visit 
South West Africa. They were refused entry by the South 
African authorities and were reported to have considered 
crossing the border from Bechuanaland. The writer was in 
Windhoek at the time (1960) and discovered that the airport 
control tower did have instructions to allow a United Nations 
plane to land, rather than risk a crash if it ran out of fuel. 
At the time of the committee's visit, Britain was hesitant 
to allow Bechuanaland to become involved. South Africa 
intensified police coverage along the B.P. border and, in 
the end, the mission did not venture beyond Southern 
Rhodesia. 
The physical border is not physiographically significant. 
Although previously agreed, it was first demarcated by 
German and British teams working in 1902 and 1903. The 
account of the marking of the boundary, contained in the 
German military publication, Militar Woche~zblatt, in 1913, 
is one of hardship and perseverance by both parties against 
dangerous odds imposed by nature. The Boer War was an 
additional hazard for the British, and an Herero uprising 
killed I 8 of the German commission. 
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More recently, the South Africans have checked the 
boundary and f L n d  only a few hundred yards of error, a 
remarkable tribute to the Germans, considering that they 
depended upon the accuracy of watches brought up from 
the coast with an error of less than a second. The border is 
fenced, originally to control game. However, South Africa 
has been strengthening the fencing round all the High 
Commission Territories since leaving the Gommonwealth. 
" 
The fence is sturdy, but sections are occasionally knocked 
down by large herds of animals such as wildebeest, who 
encounter it running across open country, and are unable 
to stop until the mass has forced its way through with 
casualties. The South African surveyors have themselves 
crossed it by pulling out enough posts for parts of the fence 
to flatten on the ground, allowing a truck to be driven 
through. 
Physical control along the entire South West Africa and 
B.P. borders would require large numbers of troops. On the 
other hand, surveillance is not difficult in the ope* country, 
and South Africa may well utilise some new helicopters as 
an economical form of 'fence-riding'. The Abrahams escape: 
and subsequent kidnapping late; discussed, showed how 
easy it was to move either way at  that time. The new alertness 
would probably make both manoeuvres much harder to 
repeat, after years in which the border meant little to 
anyone except the occasional African cattle smuggler. 
South Africa has refused to accept Bechuanaland beef on 
the hoof, giving fear of foot and mouth disease as the reason. 
This is alreadv an endemic wroblem in South West Africa. 
Measures to control smuggling may thus be aimed either at  
cattle or at  political suspects, and it is not always easy to 
distinguish between them. 
At the 1963 session of the Legislative Council, Mr. T. T. 
Tsheko of Ngamiland stirred support for his motion that 
Bechuanaland should take over the Caprivi Strip. Some 
of the 20,000 Africans in the 15,000 square miles of desert, 
scrubland, and swamp are Bechuanas, although the 
majority are Mpukushu. It  is certainly a trading point 
between the B.P. Government and South Africa as the 
administering power for South West Africa. If Bechuana- 
land acquired the Caprivi, it would gain broader access to 
Zambia and, a valuable point in decades to come, a 
common border with Angola. 
Rhodesia (Southern Rhodesia) 
Southern Rhodesia's special interest in the Tati Gon- 
cession, the desire of some white farmers in the Tati to join 
with Rhodesia, the use hitherto of Bulawayo as the major 
shopping city for northeastern Bechuanaland, and the 
ownership of the railroad through the B.P., are not of great 
significance in forming African attitudes. One is unable to 
find Africans who would wish that their part of the B.P. 
were annexed to Rhodesia. 
On the other hand, in discussions with Matabele in the 
Bulawayo area, some of them seemed not averse to re- 
establishing the Matabele hegemony of Lobengula in the 
last century over much of northern Bechuanaland. I t  
is well within the realm of possibility that a predominantly 
African government in Rhodesia may some day have 
territorial ambitions towards Bechuanaland. 
At the present political juncture, the white Government 
of Rhodesia, fully occupied after the break-up of the 
federation and resulting economic and political problems, 
is not actively interested in adventuring westwards. 
And across the border, neither the British Government nor 
the leaders of African political parties are interested in 
closer association with Southern Rhodesia. Thus, significant 
developments in the relationships of the two territories await 
a day when Africans have a greater voice in the affairs of 
Rhodesia. 
Meanwhile, there is a key Bechuanaland issue involving 
Rhodesia. As we have already seen the only rail link 
between South Africa, its ports and land-locked Rhodesia 
passes through, and admirably serves, the eastern part of the 
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B.P. The northernmost extension of the South African 
Railways ends at Beit Bridge on the Transvaal-Rhodesian 
border. I t  is a short sixty-odd miles to the Rhodesian rail- 
head at  West Nicholson. In the past, Southern Rhodesia 
has been hesitant to see this link closed, despite repeated 
advances from the South African side, because of a fear 
by the English-speaking whites of Southern Rhodesia 
of being swallowed up economically by South Africa and, 
in later years, fear of a dynamic Afrikaner Nationalism. 
Not a few important figures in Rhodesian politics from 1948 
to 1960 were English-speaking South Africans who had left 
the Republic. The whole climate has so changed in southern 
Africa that it is difficult to recall that from about 194.8 to 
1956 many people in South Africa either moved or bought 
farms in the Rhodesias as insurance against revolution in 
the former. Rhodesia had a clear and peaceful path of 
quiet multi-racial government, so the reasoning ran, and 
Afrikaner cabinet ministers were criticised by their own 
Press for buying farms in Northern and Southern Rhodesia 
as a precaution. 
But the tide of African nationalism has swept down the 
continent, and not at  the gentle snail's pace many sympa- 
thetic whites had not only welcomed but encouraged; 
the point has been reached where legislation against 
the African political parties in Rhodesia and the 
suspension of civil liberties are in some quarters felt to be 
more severe than in South Africa. Whites in Rhodesia 
are rather more fearful for their physical safety than 
their Republican counterparts, a fear reflected in a baclr- 
trek of significant numbers of whites who now feel that 
South Africa is the safer place for them. In the background 
of this is a process which tends to draw the white-dominated 
Government of Rhodesia closer to near-by South Africa 
(with fewer anti-South African leaders in the Rhodesian 
Press than were featured a decade ago) than appeared possi- 
ble at  the time the Federation was launched. Let us recall 
that it was the Labour Party in Great Britain, many of 
whose African experts wished to snatch Southern Rhodesia 
from the jaws of Afrikaner domination, who originally 
encouraged the Federation. Today, they would still fear 
Rhodesian ties with the Republic; however they no longer 
have any direct control of the situation. Far more important 
is the strong and sympathetic support of African leadership 
in independent Zambia and Malawi for the African 
political parties who oppose Southern white Govern- 
ment. 
In the markedly changed climate of 1963, Southern 
Rhodesia and South Africa began secret discussions about 
" 
establishing a direct rail link between the two countries. 
I t  is possible to go by rail from the Transvaal to Louren~o 
Marques in Mozambique, and thence on to Southern 
Rhodesia, but this is not a practicable route, nor politically 
safe if Portugal finds its hands full with an uprising in its 
east coast territory. The Mafeking-to-Bulawayo railway 
through Bechuanaland is vital. 
So far, no responsible official of the B.P. Government nor 
any African leader has suggested that Bechuanaland could 
exert political pressure on either Rhodesia or South Africa 
by thkatenini to cut this link. Such a step is not likely at 
the present time. But in cold strategic logic, the possibility 
of such a cut stands out like a sore thumb. Trade between 
Rhodesia and South Africa is vital to both these 
countries. I t  would be a guerilla action of no great difficulty 
to cut the single line of rail-and to do it again when it had 
been repaired-despite genuine protective efforts of the 
Bechuanaland police. Both the potential threats-political 
and military-are real ones. 
The discussions between Southern Rhodesia and South 
Africa were not, interestingly enough, primarily con- 
cerncd with closing the short gap between West Nichol- 
son and Beit Bridge. Building of this link is not the chief 
construction problem, which in fact occurs on the Rhodesia 
side of the border between West Nicholson and the main 
Rhodesian line. This section is lightly built, with many 
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curves, and its improvement to a point where it would carry 
all South Ali-ican-Rhodesian rail traffic would be difficult 
and expensive. A more likely route, currently under dis- 
cussion, is from West Nicholson in the direction of the 
Rhodesian line to Lourengo Marques. Such a line would 
open up a fertile part of Rhodesia and would make a 
major development contribution. This line would provide 
much shorter access from the industrial parts of the Republic 
to the main centres of Rhodesia than does the present 
route whereby goods from Johannesburg destined for a 
Rhodesian station east of it on the map must first travel 
right across the Western Transvaal as part of an enormous 
loop. 
Needless to say, people in authority in Bechuanaland are 
deeply concerned lest such a new railway be completed and 
deprive Bechuanaland of its excellent position in regard to 
train schedules. A future Government might, without the 
heavy through traffic, have to subsidise the railway in 
Bechuanaland. The British Ambassador in Pretoria is 
much concerned with the issue. So is Seretse Khama. 
He told me in late 1963 that he was prepared to go to 
Southern Rhodesia and personally appeal to the Govern- 
ment not to take a step which could have far-reaching and 
deleterious effects upon the economy of Bechuanaland. 
Partly in order to meet Bechuanaland's anxiety, the 
territory signed an official agreement with Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia that both territories would consult the 
B.P. on any proposal relating to the railway which might 
adversely affect the traffic of the section passing through 
Bechuanaland. The Attorney General of Bechuanaland, 
A. 6. Tilbury, also negotiated an agreement for consultation 
in the Railways Court set up by the two Rhodesias. 
In the long run, as suggested in our consideration of 
Bechuanaland's ties with South West Africa, the long-held 
dream of making an Atlantic Coast outlet for Rhodesia 
could well be brought to fruition by crossing the Kalahari 
to a port in South West Africa or even, as has been mooted 
from time to time, utilising the superb potential harbour 
at  the Bay of Tigers in southernmost Angola. 
But at present the general conclusion must be that 
Bechuanaland and Rhodesia, despite their mutual boundary, 
have relatively little to say to each other. 
Relations with Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) 
An inherent difficulty of Bechuanaland following a really 
independent line vis-d-vis South Africa or, for its African 
leaders, vis-d-vis Great Britain, has been Bechuanaland9s 
isolation from the fountainheads of Pan-Africanism. The 
Mrican leaders of Bechuanaland, let alone the lesser 
lieutenants, have not until recently even met the men who 
mould African political thought. Seretse Mhama did not 
meet Kenneth Kaunda, the Prime Minister of neighbouring 
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), until both attended Kenya's 
independence celebration in Nairobi in December 1963. 
Time will certainly change this, but time will not alter the 
fact that Bechuanaland has come late and almost last to 
the ranks of emergent African countries. In addition to the 
late flowering of a sense of nationhood within its borders 
is the geographical isolation of Bechuanaland, without a 
seaport or a major airport. I t  is not easily accessible even 
to African leaders, many of whom could not pass through 
its neighbours. 
The recent independence of Zambia at  once makes 
leaders of Pan-Africa persona grata there. The pontoon ferry 
across the confluence of the Zambezi and the Ghobe Rivers 
provides the physical access from Bechuanaland. Indepen- 
dent Zambia is in a position to offer economic assistance 
and, if it went that far, even military assistance or transit 
facilities for Bechuanaland-bound arms. 
I t  is no reflection upon African states to say that the 
enthusiasm of the citizens of one country for providing 
major economic assistance to citizens of another has limits. 
The general unpopularity of Foreign Aid in the United 
S ~ k s  i  matched by the once highly vocal criticism in 
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Ghana of the "gift' of ten million pounds to Guinea an- 
nounced in 1958. The fact that the amount was much larger 
than the development sum desperately requested by the 
relatively backward Northern Territory of Ghana, but 
turned down on grounds of financial stringency, left the 
Northerners something less than enchanted. The generosity 
and open-handed spirit of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's practical 
demonstration of 'African brotherhood3 foundered in part 
on the rock of Ghana nationalism, and the full sum is 
unlikely ever to be paid. 
Zambia is probably richer per capita than any other 
independent African state. There is no doubt that the 
African leaders, judged by previous actions as well as by 
their solicited comments in Lusaka, will act with a spirit 
of brotherhood towards Bechuanaland and other poor 
African nations. But Zambia, for all its great copper 
revenues, has more worthwhile and needed projects for its 
own citizens than even it can finance. With the economic 
pressures stemming from the desires and aspirations of the 
masses-such as the demand that every child be given a 
chance to go to school in the country districts as well as in 
the urban areas-Zambia will very understandably 
think twice before subsidising another country. In the 
Pan-Africanist cause, the merit of a second front against 
the Portuguese in Angola's back door is itself to be weighed 
against Portuguese control of east and west mast ports. 
In the short run, Zambia can now offer to Bechuana- 
land wise and sympathetic support, no doubt access to the 
new Zambian educational institutions, and also a 
strategic route for people as opposed to freight. In the long 
run, the possibilities of co-operation along both political 
and economic lines are however not numerous. Zambia 
can use only so much beeE, and only some 7,000 carcasses 
now come annually from the B.P. The annual copper 
needs of the latter are less than the output of one mine for 
one day. But at  least the two countries differ from many 
African neighbours in that they do not compete for export 
markets. 
Soviet Union and the United States 
Without recapitulating their African policies in general, 
one can predict that both the great nuclear powers will 
approach Bechuanaland in accordance with past principles. 
Neither country is now actively concerned. 
The United States policy of having its diplomatic report- 
ing on Bechuanaland covered by occasional visitors from 
its Pretoria embassy makes economic sense, but has long 
been politically anachronistic. The U.S. was limited until 
1964 to official relationships with Bechuanaland through 
appropriate British officials in London. The change to 
the present practice of stationing an American official in 
Swaziland to report on the three territories has merit but 
leaves the U.S. still isolated from daily contact with respons- 
ible leaders in Bechuanaland. 
American policy is to keep its Peace Corps out of depen- 
dent countries, although the Peace Corps could provide a 
handful of desperately needed teachers for Bechuanaland. 
I t  is true that an exception to the dependency rule was 
made in the case of Nyasaland as a result of direct commit- 
ments by the late President Kennedy following approaches 
by Dr. Banda. I t  was of less consequence to the U.S. that 
the Federal Government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was 
incensed by the way the Nyasaland Peace Corps project 
was handled than it was for the Americans to gain early 
good will among Nyasas. A similar premature start is unlikely 
in the High Commission Territories without open British 
approval. 
The United States plays a part in a number of varied 
projects affecting Bechuanaland. Some Americans, partic- 
ularly the historian, C. W. de Kiewiet, an American who 
grew up in South Africa, have played a significant role in the 
reorganisation of Roma College in Basutoland into a uni- 
versity for the three territories. 'Operation Crossroads', 
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consisting of young Americans-white and Negro-has 
undertaken brief work projects in the B.P. American Metal 
Climax is involved through its control of Rhodesian Selec- 
tion Trust and R.S.T's mineral agreement with the Bamang- 
wato. The United States Navy operated a research project 
near Ghanzi during part of 1963. The American naval 
researchers set up a base in the far reaches of the Kalahari, 
because it is the one accessible point of land which is the 
exact antipodes of a radio station on American soil, and thus 
could be used to test the convergence of radio waves. But, 
on balance, the United States contact with Bechuanaland 
is minimal. 
American concern with the power situation in southern 
Mrica-over half of the American investments in Africa 
are in South Africa-and its traditional commitment to 
independence for colonial territories and encouragement of 
democratic government, suggests that the United States 
will keep a sharp eye on the territory ofits closest N.A.T.O. 
ally. General support for British goals in Bechuanaland can 
be anticipated, as can eventual political and economic 
support of peaceful Bechuana aspirations. 
The Soviet Union has even less direct contact with 
Bechuanaland, but it also keeping a weather eye on develop- 
ments. Possibly the best informed Soviet academician is 
Professor Ivan Potekhin, long a specialist on southern 
Africa, although his only African field work has been in 
Ghana and Egypt. He is personally well aware of the basic 
facts of the Protectorate and, as he comments, is kept up to 
date by frequent visits to Moscow by people well informed 
on political developments in southern Africa. 
The Soviet view of Bechuanaland was summarised in 
February 1963 by A. Strogovich in an article in the Moscow 
publication Az@a i Afrika Segodnya (Asia and Africa Today). 
The author strongly attacks the backwardness of the terri- 
tory and lays this at the door of Great Britain. He criticises 
the expenditure of a quarter of the budget on the Adminis- 
tration and police compared with one-sixth on education 
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and one-tenth on hospital services. The division of the 
countrv into 'tribal reservations' is attacked. as is the fact 
that Bechuanaland does not even have a paramount 
"chief'. This comment should not be misunderstood as 
supporting chiefs, since the appointment of chiefs is criticised 
as being backward. The Soviet article regrets the lack of an 
organisation to 'combine the efforts of the whole people 
against the enslavers . . .', inasmuch as 'every effort to estab- 
lish such an organisation met with punishment of the 
workers9. At the time of the article,-Soviet praise was 
highest for the B.P.P. and its President Motsete and (then) 
General Secretary Mpho. 
The Soviet reaction to Prime Minister Verwoerd9s 
overture to the inhabitants of the High Commission 
Territories, to judge by Pravda (18 December 1963), was to 
imply that Britain was falsely building up South Africa as a 
threat in order to frighten Africans. They would then prefer 
to remain as 'colonial slaves9 rather than be Dart of Dr. 
Verwoerd9s 'concentration camps'. 
The Soviet mistake described earlier of receiving Mr. 
Matante of the B.P.P. in Moscow, when they expected a 
woman of the same name, is not an indication of lack of 
interest, nor necessarily of poor organisation, but rather of 
the difficulty of operating so many tliousands of miles away 
from one's nearest diplomatic base. Soviet theory regarding 
workers and peasants in West Africa has undergone 
considerable modification with experience. The expulsion 
of the highly regarded Soviet ambassador to Guinea, their 
unpublicised gaffe in refusing a visa to a touring Ugandan 
ambassador, and many other mistakes, suggest that Soviet 
efforts in southern Africa will be as much by the trial and 
error method as those of most nations inexperienced in a 
new region. 
Although the Communist Party operates freely in Basuto- 
land, and has recently begun publication of the Party 
publication TOKOLOKO (Freedom), there is no legal 
Communist Party in Bechuanaland. I t  is doubtful if a 
1°4 BECHUANALAND 
genuine sub-rosa party exists. A few individual Bechuanas 
who have lived in South Africa are to one degree or another 
Marxist-oriented, but they are not bound ogether in an 
active organisation. 
Since the decision of the Communist Party in South Africa 
to undertake active sabotage, a substantial number of well- 
known and thus exposed Party members have passed 
through Bechuanaland from the Republic, en route to 
woints north. 
Great publicity was given in 1963 to the escape via 
Swaziland into Bechuanaland by Harold Wolpe and Arnold 
Goldreich, who had been arrested following the Rivonia 
Raid near Johannesburg, in which short-wave equipment 
and incriminating evidence was re~orted to have been 
found by the pol';ce. Among the la&er there was said to 
have been a paper on the manufacture of incendiary bombs 
in Goldreich's handwriting. Both Wolpe and Goldreich 
were extremely nervous while in Francistown, and volun- 
tarily spent several nights in jail. There was certainly 
hostility among the white population. When the DG-3 
sent by East African Airways was sabotaged and burned 
on the Francistown airport, the nervousness increased. 
Most observers believe that it was the local act of a group 
of white residents without the knowledee of the Bechuana- 
u 
land police and without assistance from South African 
sources. However, no definite evidence is available to con- 
firm or deny this theory. 
So far, the Soviet Union has not extended itself on the 
tactical level in southern Africa. Trade with South Africa 
continues both through intermediaries and directly as far 
as diamonds are concerned. The involvement in Bechuana- 
land of any local Communists appears to be characteristic 
of unassisted efforts, such as those the Communist Party 
in South Africa has struggled for decades to mount and 
finance without material assistance from the Communist 
world. The potential challenge to the Soviet Union by 
Peking for control of the Communist movements in southern 
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Africa could change this rapidly. One possible portent i s  
the headway made by the Cape Town-based pro-Peking 
Y.C.C.C. (Yu Chi Chan Club), believed to have been led by 
Neville Alexander behre his imprisonment, concentrating 
upon the Coloured population, as distinct from the Musco- 
vite Communist efforts to influence Africans by penetration 
and manipulation of the African National Congress. 
One may assume a general rise in both Soviet and 
American interest in Bechuanaland. The intensity of 
concern may, like that in Africa generally, vary inversely 
with the extension of more cordial feelings between the 
Cold War Ieaders. The amount of trade involved is not 
significant to either power. The politically strategic value 
of the Protectorate is the key to actions in Washington or 
Moscow. 
Pan-Afican Mouernent 
Pan-Africanism has many forms. Culturally, Afi-icans 
of the French expression, particularly in Senegal, have 
given the lead. President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana has 
contributed ideas of an 'African personality9. Economically, 
the African states seek to raise their living standards by 
co-operation in trade and development. Politically, the 
emergence from the Addis Ababa Conference of a unitary 
organisation of African states was a major boost. Militarily, 
the movement seeks the elimination of colonialism from 
the continent, and particularly the end of Portuguese and 
white South African rule. The military objective is a major 
contributor to political unity. 
Both African parties in Bechuanaland are sympathetic 
to the cultural, economic, and political goals of Pan- 
Africanism. Neither would support the laws of Angola or 
of South Africa. But the Bechuanaland Democratic Party 
is less willing to achieve military goals at the price of sacri- 
ficing economic goals, and possibly bringing about the 
disintegration of Bechuanaland itself. 
Some general guidelines applicable to Bechuanaland 
were laid down by the Co-ordinating Committee of the 
African organisation. These were first successfully applied 
by the Goodwill Mission of the Go-ordinating Committee 
for the Liberation of Africa to the Angola Nationalists in 
Leopoldville from 13 to 18 July 1963. The eight general 
principles include three which apply particularly to 
Bechuanaland : 
In considering aid to any given colonial or dependent territory, 
the dependent territory, the relation, concern and interest of 
immediate neighbouring independent African countries with 
contiguous boundaries must be taken into consideration as well. 
Independent countries geographically contiguous to a given 
non-independent country because of their local knowledge and 
proximity, should play a vital role in the advancement and 
progress of that territory to the goal of liberation and independence. 
Where an independent state is used as a base for the purpose of 
liberation of a colonial territory care must be taken to evolve 
such a policy of action as would not lead to the destruction of 
sovereignty and independence of that State or prejudicing its 
security. 
Another general principle is the avoidance of competing 
organisations. This is meant to force a common front inside 
a country under pressure. Whether it applies to Bechuana- 
land in relation to its neighbours is doubtful. In the heyday 
of the Casablanca group, Ghana had taken the lead by 
supporting the Bechuanaland People's Party. However, 
before the Addis Ababa Conference, Ghanaian support 
(in total less than R~,ooo) had dwindled. Whether the new 
organisation would support one African party against 
another in Bechuanaland is as doubtful as whether it would 
apply pressure to make them merge. Much depends upon 
whether the B.P. is itself viewed as a country to 'fight for', 
or primarily in the light of its physical proximity to South 
Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia, and even Angola. 
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During 1963, the Pan-African nations were successful in 
promoting a recommendation to the General Assembly 
by the United Nations Special Committee on Colonialism 
to send U.N. observer teams to the High Commission Terri- 
" 
tories to prevent a South African 'take-over'. The vote was 
adopted by 17 to 3, with 2 abstentions. Britain, Australia, 
and the United States formed the negative.minority. This 
recommendation did not lead to action. although another 
L, 
part of it, urging Britain to proceed to general elections 
based upon universal suffrage, will soon be acted upon. 
It is however likely that this British action was not signifi- 
cantly affected by this particular U.N. Committee 
recommendation. 
Relations with Great Britain 
Not only does Great Britain administer Bechuanaland, 
provide many of its public servants, and protect it in the 
larger world, but Britain is likely to be the closest of all 
nations to an independent Bechuanaland. African experi- 
ence suggests that for most former British, French, and 
Belgian colonies, the tie with the metropolitan power 
remains close even where the acid of war, as in Algeria, 
or the acidity of being rejected, as France was by Guinea, 
corrodes their history. There is virtually no genuine 
antagonism against Great Britain among the Bechuanas. 
There are many unsatisfied wants, historical instances of 
misjudgments, inequities, and, always, the anti-colonial 
cry which precedes independence. But when one questions 
the leaders and rank and file of the more militant Bechuana- 
land People's Party, their grievances have a petty ring to 
them, and they are ready to break off a denunciation of 
Britain to have tea with one of Her Majesty's officials. 
The power relationships of the U.K. to the Protectorate 
are .closely interwoven with Britain's policies towards 
South Africa, a subject calling for a lengthy book in itself. 
When you have over one thousand million pounds invested 
in a acounlry, approximately a quarter of your overseas 
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investments, there is reason to weigh words with care. Other 
British concerns are affected by the strategic importance 
of the Cape of Good Mope and the Simonstown naval base, 
the position of all three territories, and, despite the 
severance of Commonwealth association, an extra-legal tie 
to over one million British-descended citizens of the Republic 
of South Africa. Also in the scale, and weighing more 
heaviIy with passing years, are the wishes and interests of 
the Commonwealth, and especially India, Pakistan and the 
new African members. Neither Great Britain nor the 
United States was happy to find itself as part of small and 
thoroughly out-voted minorities on many of the key African 
issues at  the United Nations in 1963. 
If Britain is occasionally under siege for persevering 
with certain principles which may involve an unpopular 
position vis-2-vis either South Africa or Rhodesia, she 
has little hesitation in implementing the various liberal 
provisions of the United Nations Charter in Bechuanaland 
itself. The local Ad~ninistration is forthrightly opposed to 
discrimination on the basis of race, and many of its members 
make a particular effort in their personal lives to give extra 
help to individual Bechuanas. 
Special mention must be made of the Abrahams kid- 
napping case to which Dr. Verwoerd referred in his major 
policy statement. I t  is an example of Britain standing up 
strongly for what was right in Bechuanaland on one hand, 
but not giving way to panic and hasty and ill-advised 
action on the other. Dr. Kenneth Abrahams is a South 
African, classified as Coloured, and a graduate of the Uni- 
versity of Cape Town Medical School. According to friends 
of his whom I interviewed, he was never very politically 
minded. That is often a matter of degree among educated 
Goloured people in Cape Town, because even those who are 
known as 'pro-Government' are rarely in sympathy with 
many aspects of the traditional segregation in South Africa, 
and have been further irritated by petty 'klein ajartlzeid' 
annoyances in recent years. 
Be that as it may, the South African Police sought to 
arrest Dr. Abrahams in the Baster area of Rehoboth, south 
of Windhoek in South West Africa. The Basters resisted the 
idea of arresting their doctor (and political mentor?) and 
refused to co-operate. A four-hour community meeting issued 
a statement that 'every man, woman and child will surround 
the house and the only way the police can take him away 
is over our dead bodies.' 
The Wehoboth Basters are a proud, stubborn, suspicious 
people. Their origins lie in the eighteenth century Gape 
Golony when, as a racially mixed group descended from 
Boer farmers and Hottentots, they trekked north to establish 
their own republic. Like similar republics of that era, they 
considered themselves proper 'burghers', and to this day 
take great pride in their individual land ownership. Many 
of them are light complexioned, and on the whole they do 
not associate with either the usual Gape Goloured popula- 
tion or any of the African groups. The South African 
Government has found them very prickly to deal with as a 
community. Its attempt in the Odendaal Report to create 
a 'Basterstan' has had a mixed reception. 
Behind the scenes, their show of resistance to the group of 
policemen and security officers in Rehoboth escalated 
rapidly to the highest level of the South African Govern- 
ment. Quite unusually, the South African Government 
did not force the issue in the light of the extremely delicate 
nature of South West Africa's political status. Sufficient 
evidence appears to have been available (later related to 
material the South African Police say was uncovered in 
the Rivonia raid) for Dr. Abrahams' arrest under South 
African law. However, the police stalled their action and 
finally, on 18 July 1963, the Deputy Minister of South 
West African Affairs announced that Abrahams would not 
be arrested, provided he did not leave the Baster capital 
and concentrated on his medical work. 
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Two weeks later, on 3 August, it was reported that Dr. 
Abrahams, with two companions, had secretly left the settle- 
ment, succeeded in avoiding police posts, and had passed 
into western Bechuanaland. Early on the morning of I X  
August, some miles out of Ghanzi on the road to Lobatsi, 
they were held up in 'wild west' fashion by six men. Some 
were armed, wore masks, blue jeans, cowboy hats and 
revolver holsters. Abrahams and his companions were then 
kidnapped after a scuffle and taken back to South West 
Africa. 
On 14 August the South African Commissioner of Police 
announced that Abrahams had been arrested by a police 
patrol in the Gobabis District (adjoining Bechuanaland) 
and was already in Cape Town to be charged with violation 
of the Suppression of Communism Act and the act against 
sabotage. 
The South African Minister of Justice, John Vorster, 
who generally speaks with legal caution, made a statement 
in which he branded as ridiculous the subsequent charge 
that the South African Police had anything to do with 
the kidnapping. He had every logical reason to make such a 
statement. Presumably, he knew nothing of any kidnapping 
plans. The Prime Minister had said repeatedly that South 
Africa had to use great tolerance in dealing with the 
Territories. If the Minister of Justice was already refrain- 
ing from arresting a man inside South West Africa, why 
risk the easily exposed and diplomatically dangerous action 
of kidnapping a man in British territory? Obviously, the 
Mnister could not believe that an individual policeman 
could act so foolishly on his own responsibility. 
Not all the true facts have ever emerged. What appears 
to have happened is that an over-zealous South African 
policeman, with assistance from local farmers, took it upon 
himself to make up for Abrahams slipping through the 
police posts. Indeed, one farmer apparently believed that 
3 he could talk to the men from South West Africa, his 
BECHUANALAND'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS I I I 
racial good will would lead them to remain in South West 
of their own volition. 
The South African courts, when they have jurisdiction, 
can be very jealous of correct legal procedure. Far more 
often than the world recognises, they are a thorn in the side 
of Government prosecutors. When Dr. Abrahams was 
brought to the Cape Town courtroom, it was crowded 
with Coloured friends, interested Africans, and Europeans. 
In the gallery, they were all jammed together, sitting and 
standing in a friendly fashion prohibited in the southern 
states of America. 
Abrahams' lawyer was Advocate Benjamin Kies, a 
Coloured Ibrmer teacher often in conflict with segregation 
laws. His opponent was a highly promising young Afrikaner 
advocate, Jan Steyn. The Ghief Justice could scarcely 
have been more sympathetic to Kies as he presented his 
argument. The Government had no case a t  all. Steyn soon 
admitted this and conceded all Kies' argument in advance. 
But Kies was arguing not only for Abrahams' release, but 
to make political capital against the Government. He asked 
numerous embarrassing questions about where warrants 
were sworn, where the prisoner was arrested, and which 
police were involved. Finally, a judge asked Kies whether 
or not he really wanted his client to be free or, the judge 
implied, carry on the case. Dr. Abrahams was released 
shortly thereafter and joined his wife in Bechuanaland. 
The actions of the South African authorities were partly a 
response to court evidence, but Abrahams could have been 
rearrested on charges which would not come before the 
court. His release reflected South Africa's desire for good 
relations with Bechuanaland. 
But it was also an issue on which Britain could not 
compromise. Nevertheless, the British authorities in 
Bechuanaland did not fill the air with accusations and thus 
make it all. the harder for South Africa to acknowledge error. 
For on=, jushce prevaded sotlo voce. 
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CONCLUSION 
Three major pre-independence issues facing Bechuana- 
land emerge from observations we have already made. 
The first of these is that the rapid strides towards a sense of 
nationhood must continue if a nation it is to be. Tribalism 
is a potent force, if less violent because of the ethnic closeness 
of the Bechuana tribes; the apparent reluctance of some 
tribal groupings and some chiefs to pool resources in the 
national interest could however be critical. If they do not 
sink their differences, they will sink their country. 
The two main parties are not dangerously far apart in 
their political goals. Coalition is feasible. At present, if 
either major party won an election, neither would feel a 
need to imprison the leaders of their opposition. So far, 
Bechuanaland has sailed in the lee of Great Britain and has 
yet to feel the full force of the Macmillan 'wind of change'. 
When and if o~ltside forces begin backing one or another 
party or faction inside Bechuanaland, dangerous rifts 
may develop with an exacerbation of tribal feelings and the 
threat of civil war. Concurrently, one must stress that 
relationships among tribes, and also between Africans and 
Europeans, have for decades been without organised ill- 
feeling and without violence. Unless this calm continues, 
the slim reed of Bechuana nationalism will be buffeted by 
cruel winds before it has taken deep root. 
The second pre-independence need, expanded economic 
development, has been stressed along with the desirability 
of diversification and the opening of new sources of national 
revenue. The necessity for close economic ties with South 
Mrica or a carefully thought out substitute for them is 
critical. The contributions of white South Africans, many of 
whom are among the strongest boosters of an independent 
nation within the B.P., will become even more necessary. 
Indeed, as one of the B.P. officials most concerned with 
development has observed 'Bechuanaland can still fall 
back on an essentially subsistence economy; but the time is 
approaching when the dependence upon the Republic will 
be crucial.' 
The third issue is the whole arena of the formal and legal 
development of Bechuanaland and its external relations. 
Britain is as unlikely to cast adrift a ship of state headed 
for a political reef as a ship with an economically leaky hull. 
A recurring theme of these pages is that buckets of economic 
help will not fill political sieves. I t  is on the political side 
that Bechuana leaders must provide their own answers. 
Lord Wailey concludes his recent study of relationships 
between South Africa and the territories by advising the 
territories that 'It would be well for them to realise that 
liberties once lost are not easily regained by the small 
peoples of the world. What would it profit the small peoples 
of the Territories if they now loose their hold on the solid 
fact of liberty under British rule, in order that they may 
grasp at the fantasy of Independence?' 
From another perspective, we would place less emphasis 
for the future on bilateral relationships between Bechuana- 
land and Britain and greater emphasis than does Lord 
Hailey on three other factors: the ability of Bechuanas to 
steer their ship of state successfully with less help from their 
colonial mentor; the greater influence on Bechuanaland 
from the Organisation of African Unity and their greater 
influence in the United Nations in protecting the interest 
of Bechuanaland from possible encroachment; and, finally, 
a much more malleable South African policy, one not 
without elements of genuine friendship on South Africa's 
part. 
Many issues posed by the alternatives of our title- 
Bechuanaland : Pan-African Outpost or Bantu NbmeIand ? 
-have been ventilated in what we hope is a frank discus- 
sion. Time will obviously write the final answer to the 
question. Of the strategic nature of Bechuanaland in the 
struggle between Pan-Africanism and the Bantustan 
concept we have little doubt. But one factor we hope has 
emerged from these pages is a feeling for Bechuanaland and 
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the Bechuanas as not either belonging to South Mricaas 
cause or existing solely to serve a Pan-Africanist cause, but 
as a modern Bechuana nation to take its place among the 
sovereign states of African or freely to decide to associate 
itself in some larger political entity which will allow full 
expression to the Bechuanas. If history has not been 
altogether kind to them, neither has she written her worst 
pages about them. Let their future be for the Bechuanas to 
write. 
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